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THESES
1. The current state of affairs
•	 Under	 the	rule	of	Vladimir	Putin	 in	Russia,	an	authoritarian	system	has	
been	created	in	which	the	rule	of	the	President,	based	on	broad	formal	pre-
rogatives,	 is	 further	 reinforced	 by	 informal	 mechanisms	 and	 networks	
of	dependence	which	have	penetrated	the	formal	 institutions	of	 the	gov-
ernment	and	the	economy.	The	core	of	these	networks	is	a	narrow	ruling	
group	focused	around	the	President,	whose	members	consider	themselves	
to	be	the	owners	of	Russia,	and	as	such	–	entitled	to	exploit	it	for	their	own	
benefit.	The	system	is	maintained	by	means	including	strengthening	the	
mechanisms	of	 control	 over	 the	 state	 and	 society,	 repressing	opponents,	
and	disciplining	its	own	political	base.	The	most	important	tools	of	its	le-
gitimacy	are	the	conduct	of	a	great-power	policy	and	the	use	of	state	propa-
ganda	which	draws	on	Soviet	models.	
•	 The	 Russian	 economy	 is	 largely	 dependent	 for	 its	 income	 on	 energy	 ex-
ports,	 a	 dependency	which	 has	 steadily	 risen	 under	 Putin.	 Another	 im-
portant	phenomenon	is	 the	state’s	dominant	role	 in	the	economy.	The	ef-
fectiveness	of	the	economy’s	functioning	is	reduced	by	the	politicisation	of	
economic	decisions,	as	well	as	the	extent	to	which	the	ruling	elite	extracts	
rents	from	corruption.	Protectionism	in	Russia’s	economic	relations	with	
foreign	countries	is	rising.
•	 Until	the	beginning	of	Putin’s	third	term	(2012),	Russia	had	been	conduct-
ing	a	policy	of	‘soft	revisionism’,	based	on	contesting	and	undermining	the	
post-cold	war	liberal	international	order,	while	at	the	same	time	exploiting	
the	benefits	of	that	same	order.	However,	during	the	President’s	third	term	
(2012–18)	 Moscow’s	 revisionism	 became	 more	 aggressive.	 The	 Kremlin	
used	military	force	and	unleashed	a	cyber-informational	war	on	the	West	
and	its	partners.	Russia	has	also	stepped	up	its	attempts	at	forcing	through	
political	and	economic	integration	in	the	post-Soviet	area,	and	reinforced	
its	cooperation	with	non-Western	states,	especially	China.	Moscow	has	re-
turned	as	an	active	player	in	the	Middle	East	and	increased	its	presence	in	
other	regions,	rebuilding	its	image	in	Russian	society	as	a	global	power.	
•	 The	changes	which	the	Kremlin	has	introduced	to	the	Russian	armed	forces	
since	the	beginning	of	Putin’s	rule	have	been	based	above	all	on	halting	the	
degradation	of	its	military	capability,	and	thereafter	on	implementing	pilot	
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projects	 in	 the	area	of	 reorganisation	 (mainly	departing	 from	 the	 struc-
tures	inherited	from	the	USSR)	and	the	rearmament	of	the	army.	This	has	
been	accompanied	by	a	significant	increase	in	training	activity.	After	the	
war	with	Georgia	(2008),	military	spending	was	raised	to	a	level	allowing	
the	armed	forces	of	the	Russian	Federation	to	undergo	a	process	of	wide-
ranging	professionalisation	and	technical	modernisation,	the	most	impor-
tant	result	of	which	was	the	closing	of	the	technology	gap	with	the	West	(at	
present	only	the	US	is	ahead	of	Russia).	The	war	with	Ukraine	(from	2014)	
was	accompanied	by	the	expansion	of	offensive	units	(especially	those	in	
the	Western	strategic	direction),	and	the	war	in	Syria	(2015)	has	acceler-
ated	the	army’s	rearmament	with	new	generations	of	weapons	and	mili-
tary	equipment.
2. The main challenges 
•	 In	the	political	sphere,	the	main	challenge	remains	the	gradually	intensify-
ing	competition	within	the	power	elite	for	dwindling	resources,	as	well	as	
the	influence	allowing	then	to	use	those	resources.	The	state	is	being	man-
aged	in	a	dysfunctional	manner,	for	reasons	including	the	personalisation	
of	power.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	conduct	any	timely	or	correct	diagnoses	
of	 the	public	mood,	which	 is	worsening,	mainly	against	a	background	of	
the	population’s	pauperisation,	creating	a	risk	of	protests	breaking	out.
•	 In	the	economic	sphere,	 the	main	challenge	is	 the	fall	 in	performance	of	
the	 commodities-based	 economic	model,	which	no	 longer	 ensures	 stable	
growth,	and	is	in	fact	causing	repeated	economic	crises.	This	is	worsened	
by	the	trends	on	global	and	regional	energy	markets,	which	are	unfavour-
able	for	Russia	at	present.	Another	problem	may	come	from	the	potential	
tightening	of	US	economic	sanctions.	Other	key	challenges	are	the	nega-
tive	consequences	of	the	progressive	aging	of	Russian	society,	including	an	
overly	expensive	pension	system,	and	a	lack	of	foreign	investment	due	to	
the	poor	investment	climate.
•	 As	a	result	of	Russia’s	aggressive	policies,	the	level	of	its	confrontation	with	
the	West,	 especially	 the	US,	 has	 reached	 a	 dangerous	 level	 for	Moscow,	
and	incurred	significant	costs.	Therefore	the	biggest	challenge	for	Russia	
is	 the	 escalation	of	 its	 conflict	with	 the	United	States.	Another	problem	
for	Moscow	is	 the	reluctance	of	 its	non-Western	partners	 to	give	Russia	
significant	support	in	its	conflict	with	the	West.	This	applies	among	others	
to	China,	upon	which	Russia	is	increasingly	dependent.	Also,	the	political	
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and	military	success	Russia	has	achieved	in	places	such	as	Syria	is	based	
on	fragile	foundations.	A	further	challenge	for	Russia	is	the	low-intensity	
war	with	Ukraine	in	the	Donbas,	where	Moscow	has	so	far	suffered	a	stra-
tegic	defeat.
•	 For	the	Russian	Federation’s	Armed	Forces,	the	main	challenge	remains	the	
technological	barrier;	 the	 introduction	of	new	categories	of	weapons	de-
pends	on	breaking	it.	In	the	near	term,	the	implementation	of	programmes	
for	the	technical	modernisation	of	the	army	will	be	affected	by	the	inter-
national	sanctions,	which	will	hinder	the	acquisition	of	modern	weapons	
technology	 from	the	West,	and	force	Russia	 to	bear	 the	costs	of	develop-
ing	 and	 introducing	 its	 own	 counterparts.	Despite	 this,	 however,	Russia	
has	succeeded	in	developing	some	new	projects,	especially	in	the	sphere	of	
strategic	weapons.
3. Prospects
•	 In	the	perspective	of	the	next	six	years,	the	collapse	of	the	current	system	
of	power	in	Russia	seems	unlikely,	although	symptoms	of	 its	destabilisa-
tion	may	appear	 in	 certain	places,	 for	 reasons	 including	public	protests,	
mainly	against	 the	background	of	 social	 issues,	 and	conflicts	within	 the	
elites.	The	government	will	not	carry	out	any	systemic	reforms,	but	will	be	
forced	into	small	formal	adjustments	in	connection	with	the	decision	to	ex-
tend	(most	likely)	the	rule	of	Putin,	or	when	arranging	the	succession	to	his	
rule.	There	will	also	be	a	process	of	‘technocratisation’	of	the	government	
in	the	centre	and	the	regions	(friends	of	Putin	and	strong	leaders	in	formal	
executive	positions	will	be	replaced	by	technical	managers	who	do	not	have	
their	own	bases	of	support).
•	 No	significant	economic	reforms	will	take	place,	and	the	economy	of	Rus-
sia	will	 remain	dependent	 on	 external	 factors,	primarily	fluctuations	 in	
the	prices	of	raw	energy	materials.	Despite	the	implementation	of	energy	
infrastructure	projects,	exports	of	raw	materials	from	Russia	will	not	rise	
significantly;	nor	will	there	be	any	substantial	diversification	of	their	tar-
get	markets.	The	authorities	will	be	forced	to	reduce	the	costs	of	the	current	
system’s	operation,	by	means	including	further	reductions	in	social	spend-
ing.	The	economy	will	remain	in	a	state	of	stagnation	(low	growth	levels).
•	 Of	the	three	possible	scenarios	for	Russian	foreign	policy	during	Putin’s	
fourth	term,	namely	the	‘defensive-transactional’,	the	‘confronta	tional	-crisis’	
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and	the	‘inertial-opportunistic’,	the	choice	of	one	of	the	latter	two	is	most	
likely.	Which	one	Russia	chooses	will	be	dictated	by,	on	the	one	hand,	its	
assessment	of	the	situation	(including	the	level	of	crisis	in	key	states	and	
the	Western	community	as	a	whole)	and	on	the	other,	external	factors	(in	
particular	the	US’s	attitude	towards	Russia).	The	confrontational-crisis	model	
will	be	based	on	an	increase	in	indirect	(proxy)	confrontations	between	
Russia	and	the	West	(especially	the	US),	such	as	the	resumption	of	war	on	
a	larger	scale	in	Ukraine,	the	intensification	of	destabilising	activities	in	
the	Balkans,	or	even	the	conduct	of	‘hybrid’	operations	against	the	Baltic	
states.	Meanwhile,	the	inertial-opportunistic	scenario	will	be	based	on	Rus-
sia	defending	its	existing	(geo)political	achievements,	as	well	as	attempts	to	
make	aggressive	use	of	any	emerging	opportunities	(the	West’s	‘fatigue’	with	
conflict	and	the	rise	of	its	own	internal	crises)	to	demonstrate	its	military	
capabilities,	its	potential	to	harm	the	interests	of	the	West,	and	to	create	
problems	whose	resolution	would	require	its	participation.	In	particular	
Russia	will	attempt	to	drive	a	wedge	between	the	United	States	and	its	allies	
by	offering	the	latter	the	prospect	of	normalisation	of	relations	and	a	return	
to	cooperation,	especially	in	the	economic	field.	Moscow	is	continuing	to	
intensify	its	cooperation	with	China,	and	will	try	to	take	advantage	of	the	
latter’s	growing	power.	Russia	may	increase	its	influence	in	Belarus	and	in	
the	Southern	Caucasus,	while	gradually	ceding	its	influence	in	Central	Asia	
to	China.	Despite	Moscow’s	failure	in	Ukraine,	it	will	not	cease	its	attempts	
to	subjugate	it.	
•	 In	principle	the	Russian	Armed	Forces	will,	in	accordance	with	the	adopted	
plan,	continue	their	technical	modernisation	and	organisational	changes,	
increasing	their	combat	readiness	and	their	preparation	for	a	hypothetical	
armed	conflict	with	NATO.	While	they	have	achieved	a	multifaceted	advan-
tage	(in	training,	manpower	and	technological	advancement)	over	most	of	
the	European	members	of	the	Alliance,	their	principal	point	of	reference	
and	only	real	opponent	will	remain	the	American	army.	However	it	should	
be	assumed	that	despite	the	actions	already	taken	–	especially	in	the	devel-
opment	of	strategic	weapons	–	Russia	will	still	not	be	able	to	compensate	for	
the	imbalance	in	the	field	of	advanced	weapon	systems.
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IntroductIon
On	18	March	2018	Vladimir	Putin	was	elected	President	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion	for	the	fourth	time,	and	at	the	beginning	of	May	he	will	begin	his	next	
term,	which,	in	accordance	with	Russian	law,	should	last	until	2024.	During	
his	rule,	which	started	at	the	beginning	of	2000,	Putin	and	his	associates	have	
profoundly	changed	Russia,	its	economic	and	political	system,	and	its	foreign	
policy.
This	 report	 is	 intended,	firstly,	 to	act	 as	a	 summary	of	 the	 results	of	Putin’s	
rule	until	now,	in	the	areas	of	domestic	policy,	the	economy	and	foreign	policy,	
and	the	security	and	defence	spheres	related	to	these	policies.	Secondly,	it	aims	
to	characterise	the	main	challenges	which	the	Russian	authorities	face	on	the	
threshold	of	Putin’s	fourth	term.	Thirdly	and	finally,	it	will	attempt	to	outline	
the	prospects	 for	 the	Kremlin’s	policy,	and	offer	forecasts	of	 future	develop-
ments	in	those	areas	in	Russia.
On	this	basis,	the	report	is	divided	into	four	main	sections:	the	first	is	dedicat-
ed	to	issues	concerning	the	domestic	political	and	social	situation;	the	second,	
to	the	economic	situation	and	the	government’s	economic	policy;	the	third	to	
foreign	policy;	and	the	fourth	to	the	armed	forces.	In	view	of	their	specific	na-
ture,	issues	of	state	and	the	development	of	the	domestic	security	sector,	which	
are	closely	linked	to	the	domestic	political	situation,	are	mostly	discussed	in	
a	separate	appendix.	The	other	appendices	contain	additional	information	and	
data	which	give	deeper	perspective	to	selected	topics	from	the	main	body	of	
the	report.	
The	 ambition	 of	 this	 report	 is	 not	 to	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 in-depth	
presentation	 of	 the	 situation	 and	 forecasts	 concerning	Russia,	 but	 rather	 to	
offer	an	approximation,	in	summary	form	and	in	a	manner	accessible	to	the	
wider	reader,	of	what	the	authors	believe	to	be	the	most	important	phenom-
ena,	processes	and	trends	in	this	area.
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I. THE PolITIcal and SocIal SITuaTIon
1. The current state of affairs
Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (2012–18) saw a clear sharpening 
of the course of domestic policy.	The	progressive	dismantling	of	the	Yeltsin	
system	since	2000,	and	the	introduction	to	a	crippled	Russian	democracy	of	
successive	elements	of	authoritarianism,	has	led	since	2012	to	the	crystallisa-
tion	of	a	mature	authoritarian	system	with	a	strong	imperial-great	power	cast	
to	it.	This	system	is	fully	dominated	by	the	executive	authority	in	the	form	of	
the	President’s	team	(in	formal	terms,	the	President	and	his	administration;	in	
informal	terms,	the	President	and	his	most	trusted	advisors,	who	have	a	varied	
scope	of	official	powers).	In	part,	this	system	is	anchored	in	the	constitution	
(which	assigns	broad	powers	to	the	President),	but	in	part	it	was	also	created	
as	a	result	of	the	political	struggle	for	the	distribution	of	real	power	within	the	
system.	The	formal,	constitutional	division	of	powers	between	the	organs	of	
state	is	a	façade	for	the	real	mechanisms	for	decision-making	and	ruling	the	
country,	which	are	informal	in	nature,	and	based	on	personal	or	group	ties	in	
politics	and	business.	Elections	are	ritualistic	plebiscites	aimed	at	expressing	
support	for	the	government,	and	not	the	articulation	of	the	needs	and	interests	
of	social	groups.
This	system	can	be	described	as:
•	 ‘Chekist’,	due	to	the	concentration	of	the	decision-making	powers	in	the	
hands	of	politicians	with	roots	in	the	special	services	(led	by	the	President,	
a	former	KGB	officer),	with	their	particular	mentality	and	methods	of	ac-
tion	which	have	been	transferred	to	the	basis	of	state	policy.	As	a	result,	
the	elite	think	about	internal	and	foreign	policy	in	terms	of	special	opera-
tions,	where	manipulation,	provocation	and	the	use	of	force	are	standard	
tools	for	achieving	their	aims.	The	special	services,	which	have	broad	(for-
mal	and	informal)	powers	of	repression	and	control,	also	serve	as	a	binding	
agent	for	the	political	system,	the	basic	instrument	of	presidential	power	
and	control	 over	political	 and	 social	processes;	 as	 such,	 they	 remain	 the	
guarantee	of	security	for	the	political	elites	who	govern	Russia.
•	 quasi-patrimonial,	 due	 to	 the	 understanding	 by	 the	 ruling	 elite	 of	 the	
state	and	its	resources	as	the	de facto	property	of	a	narrow	group	of	deci-
sion	makers,	in	which	the	central	role	is	played	by	the	President.	The	val-
ues	enshrined	in	the	constitution	(including	property	rights)	are	an	empty	
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category,	and	the	terms	and	conditions	of	their	use	(for	example,	profiting	
from	specific	areas	of	economic	activity)	depend	on	the	arbitrary	decisions	
of	 the	 leader	and	his	entourage,	and	mostly	constitute	payment	 for	one’s	
loyalty	or	service.
•	 patronal, due	 to	 the	 predominance	 of	 informal	 networks	within	 it,	 the	
mutual	hierarchical	dependencies	between	‘patrons’	and	‘clients’	at	the	ex-
pense	of	institutional	and	legal	relationships.	The	relationships	of	author-
ity	and	subordination,	the	true	extent	of	the	state	organs’	competence,	as	
well	as	social	status,	wealth,	and	the	scope	of	the	duties	and	privileges	as-
signed	to	the	representatives	of	the	elites,	are	determined	not	so	much	by	
laws	as	by	personal	or	business	relationships.
•	 kleptocratic: consumed	by	the	systemic	corruption	which	is	present	at	eve-
ry	level	of	social	relationships,	resulting	in	significant	losses	(which	cannot	
be	estimated)	to	the	state	budget,	and	in	the	general	population’s	continued	
low	standard	of	living.	It	is	manifested	in	its	most	colourful	forms	in	the	
direct	 and	 large-scale	 embezzlement	 of	 state	property	by	 selected	mem-
bers	of	the	elite.	The	systemic	nature	of	corruption	directly	derives	from	
the	quasi-patrimonial	vision	of	the	state,	in	which	the	boundaries	between	
private	and	public	have	been	obliterated,	and	so	the	state	becomes	a	means	
to	increase	one’s	personal	wealth	at	the	expense	of	the	public.	The	state’s	re-
sources,	such	as	its	natural	resources	or	the	budget,	are	treated	like	booty	
to	be	divided	among	the	groups	of	influence	within	the	ruling	elite.
The	 consistent	 development	 of	mature	 authoritarianism	 in	 2012–18	was	 the	
result	not	only	of	the	natural	logic	of	the	development	of	the	anti-democratic	
system,	but	also	of	the	protests	which	took	place	around	the	turn	of	2012	as	an	
accompaniment	to	Putin’s	return	to	the	presidency.	He	interpreted	these	pro-
tests	as,	on	the	one	hand,	an	effect	of	the	atmosphere	of	‘liberalisation’	prevail-
ing	in	Russia	under	President	Dmitri	Medvedev	(from	2008),	which	Putin	saw	
as	threatening	the	stability	of	the	regime;	and	on	the	other	hand,	as	a	manifes-
tation	of	Western	interference	in	Russian	politics.	Both	of	these	factors	deter-
mined	the	logic	of	the	Kremlin’s	domestic	policy	in	subsequent	years.
The	main	directions	of	this	policy	include	the	following:
•	 strengthening control over all manifestations of social activity,	 in	
particular	the	media	(including	the	internet),	non-governmental	organisa-
tions	(mainly	thanks	to	the	law	on	‘foreign	agents’	of	2012)	and	opposition	
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groups,	by	the	following	means:	discrediting	them	in	the	eyes	of	society;	
restricting	 freedom	of	 expression,	 assembly	 and	 association;	 and	finally	
repression,	including	the	instrumental	use	of	the	laws	on	the	fight	against	
extremism	or	terrorism	in	order	to	crack	down	on	critics	of	the	Kremlin	
(see	Appendix	1).
•	 strengthening the institutions of force and	expanding	the	competence	
of	the	special	services	(particularly	the	Federal	Security	Service);	in	addi-
tion,	the	creation	(in	2016)	of	the	National	Guard,	which	could	potentially	
be	used	 to	suppress	protests	 (see	Appendix	2).	This	 is	 subordinate	 to	 the	
‘counterintelligence’	logic	behind	the	management	of	the	country’s	inter-
nal	security:	the	main	task	of	the	‘siloviki’	is	to	screen	society	and	the	state	
apparatus	off	from	external	influences,	and	to	search	for	external	and	in-
ternal	enemies	seeking	to	destabilise	the	political	system.	In	practice,	this	
approach	has	led	to	the	acknowledgment	of	repression	and	indoctrination	
as	the	only	effective	instruments	for	controlling	society.
•	 establishing the functions of the justice and prison system not only 
as tools for intimidating and controlling	society	 and	fighting	against	
political	opponents,	but	also	for	disciplining	members	of	the	ruling	elite.	
In	recent	years,	political	rivalry	and	the	fight	for	assets	has	taken	on	the	
form	of	the	so-called	‘fight	against	corruption’,	in	which	law	enforcement	
authorities	use	legal	investigations	as	a	means	to	settle	scores	among	fac-
tions	within	 the	 ruling	elite.	For	example,	 as	well	 as	 the	well-publicised	
case	of	corruption	against	the	former	economy	minister	Aleksei	Ulukayev,	
the	period	2016–17	saw	the	start	of	criminal	proceedings	against	4%	(in	to-
tal)	of	all	the	representatives	of	regional	elites	(heads	of	regions	and	their	
deputies,	prime	ministers	and	deputy	prime	ministers	of	regional	govern-
ments,	and	mayors	of	regional	capitals).
A key tool of legitimacy	for Russian	authoritarianism	in	the	eyes	of	the	gen-
eral	public	 is	state propaganda,	which	contains	elements	of	disinformation	
or	even	of	psychological	warfare.	Its	basis	is	the	fuelling of isolationist senti-
ments	and	the militarisation of public discourse by	the	authorities	and	the	
media.	 It	 revolves	 around	 three	main	 themes.	 First,	 it	 employs	 the	 ‘dignity’	
discourse	of	a	great	imperial	power,	and	(similarly	to	the	Soviet	era)	the	mo-
tif	of	the	external	military	threat,	primarily	from	the	United	States.	Secondly,	
Putin	is	presented	as	a	strong	leader,	to	whom	there	is	no	alternative	–	the	only	
guarantor	of	 the	 integrity	and	security	of	 the	 state.	Thirdly,	 it	disseminates	
a	neo-Soviet	policy	of	memory	based	on	emphasising	personalities	(including	
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Joseph	Stalin)	and	events	from	the	past	that	legitimise	the	idea	of	authoritarian	
power	through	its	link	with	‘great	achievements’.	This	propaganda	is	accompa-
nied	by	the	development	of	so-called	patriotic education in	school	curricula,	
focused	around	the	government	and	army,	as	well	as	a	messianic	vision	of	his-
tory	(Russia	as	the	liberator	of	the	Western	world	from	fascism)	as	the	main	
axes	of	 state	and	national	 identity.	One	of	 its	essential	elements	 is	 the	crea-
tion	of	paramilitary	groups,	including	some	which	involve	school-age	children	
(such	as	Yunarmia,	the	Young	Army,	created	in	2016	under	the	patronage	of	
the	Ministry	of	Defence).
These	actions,	at	least	in	the	declarative	sphere,	have	brought	results.	During	
Putin’s	third	term	the	polls	showed	an	unprecedentedly	high level of a sense 
of national pride and satisfaction with the activities of the authorities.	
The	apogee	of	this	support	was	recorded	after	the	annexation	of	Crimea	(March	
2014),	which	sparked	social	euphoria.	By	using	mechanisms	for	strengthening	
national	identity	by	referring	to	an	external	enemy,	the Kremlin has direct-
ed Russian society onto a path of warlike mobilisation,	which	 led	 to	 the	
suspension	of	the	traditional	criteria	for	evaluating	the	efficiency	of	the	ruling	
class.	In	this	context,	it	is	worth	noting	the	rise	in	trust	for	the	army	and	special	
services	since	2014.	Although	the	President’s	current	ratings	have	decreased	
slightly	–	which	on	 the	one	hand	 is	 linked	 to	 the	noticeable	deterioration	of	
the	population’s	economic	situation,	and	on	the	other	with	growing	fatigue	at	
the	present	regime	–	support	for	him	still	remains	at	above	80%.	However,	it	
must	be	noted	that	this	support	is	largely declarative, and is due to any lack 
of alternatives to Putin; it is therefore not as strong and widespread as 
opinion polls suggest.	The	dominant	attitudes	in	society	are,	in	fact,	political	
apathy	and	conformism,	which	will	pose	a	problem	for	the	Kremlin	if	it	needs	
to	mobilise	active,	and	not	just	passive	public	support	for	the	government.
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Figure 1. Support for Putin (in answer to the question “Do you support the 
activity of the President?”)
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In 2018 the Levada Center was forced to suspend the publication of opinion polls concerning domestic 
politics in connection with the presidential elections, because the government had assigned it the status 
of a ‘foreign agent’, which prohibits it engaging in activities related to the political sphere.
Source: Levada Center https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/ 
Figure 2. Public trust in institutions (in answer to the question “To what 
extent do the institutions mentioned below merit your trust?”)
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Source: Levada Center, October 2017; https://www.levada.ru/2017/10/12/institutsionalnoe-doverie-3/
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It	is	noteworthy	that	the	level	of	support	for	the	government	in	the	polls	re-
mains	high	regardless	of	the constantly deteriorating financial situation of 
the general public in recent years.	The	crisis,	and	then	the	stagnation,	with	
which	the	Russian	economy	has	been	struggling	since	2014	(these	issues	are	
discussed	further	in	part	II,	Economy)	mean	that	there	has	been	a	decline	in	
real	income	for	four	years	in	a	row	in	Russia.
Figure 3. The real income of society (change in percent)
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Source: Rosstat, www.gks.ru, 2018
The	economic	crisis	has	forced	Russians	to	make	savings	on	even	the	most	ba-
sic	expenses;	it	has	hit	the	poorest	in	society	hardest,	and	led	to	an	increase	in	
the	number	of	people	living	below	the	poverty	threshold.	At	present,	according	
to	government	estimates,	about	20	million	Russians	have	an	income	below	the	
minimum	subsistence	level	(although	this	data	may	be	incomplete).	However,	
this	has	not	resulted	in	any	significant	increase	in	dissatisfaction	with	the	gov-
ernment,	which	is	largely	the	consequence	of	a	paternalistic	attitude	towards	
the	state	widespread	among	Russians;	the	great	adaptability	which	they	have	
acquired	during	previous	crises;	and	 the	weakness	of	any	cooperative	skills	
which	could	improve	their	position,	as	well	as	being	a	result	of	the	authorities’	
aggressive	propaganda.	
However,	in recent years an increase in	the number of protests	connected 
with the economic crisis has been noted.	The	actions,	or	the	neglect,	of	the	
government	–	such	as	delays	in	paying	salaries	(often	for	several	months),	or	
layoffs	–	have	undermined	the	population’s	fundamental	feeling	of	material	se-
curity,	and	have	thus	generated	a	high	level	of	determination	and	even	desper-
ation	among	the	protesters.	The	most	spectacular	protests	in	2017	were	caused	
by	 the	 decision	 to	 introduce	 the	 Platon	 system	 of	 very	 costly	 highway	 tolls	
(which	resulted	in	a	nationwide	strike	by	truck	drivers),	as	well	as	the	Moscow	
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authorities’	plan	to	resettle	a	significant	number	of	the	capital’s	inhabitants	as	
part	of	the	renovation	of	the	housing	sector	(the	protests	by	the	inhabitants	of	
the	khrushchovki,	apartment	blocks	built	during	the	Khrushchev	period	which	
were	scheduled	for	demolition).
Social dissatisfaction with a political background (demands	for	changes	to	
the	model	of	government,	anti-Putin	slogans)	has	appeared on a much small-
er scale,	and	is	geographically	limited,	mainly	to	the	major	cities	(especially	
Moscow	and	Saint	Petersburg),	and	in	social	terms	is	characterised	above	all	
by	representatives	of	the	middle	class.	This	potential	has	been	expertly	culti-
vated	by	the	opposition	figure	Aleksei	Navalny	(currently	the	Kremlin’s	main	
political	opponent),	both	in	the	virtual	realm	(mainly	on	social	networks)	and	
at	the	level	of	street	activity.	Online	interest	in	the	corruption	scandals	among	
Russia’s	ruling	elite	which	have	been	revealed	by	Navalny’s	Foundation	for	the	
Fight	against	Corruption,	as	well	as	the	anti-corruption	protests	he	organised	
in	dozens	of	Russian	cities	throughout	2017	(which	gathered	tens	of	thousands	
of	people	and	inspired	a	significant	number	of	young	people	who	had	previous-
ly	been	politically	passive),	demonstrated	that	the	motivation	for	the	protests	
go	beyond	the	realm	of	the	strictly	social.
2. The main challenges
The	period	from	2018	to	2024	is	the	final	presidential	term	Putin	is	permitted	
under	the	current	constitution.	We	must	assume	that	after	its	expiration	he	
intends	to	retain	a	fundamental,	strategic	influence	on	Russian	politics:	either	
as	President-for-life,	or	in	a	symbolic	form	as	‘father	of	the	nation’,	taking	the	
most	important	decisions	into	his	own	hands.	Both	of	these	options	will re-
quire constitutional changes:	either	an	abolition	of	the	limit	on	the	number	
of	presidential	terms,	or	the	preparation	of	a	‘successor	operation’,	which	will	
likely	involve	a	formal	weakening	of	the	President’s	office.	Whichever	option	
is	selected,	two	issues	will	be	crucial	for	the	stability	of	the	system:	the	mobi-
lisation	and	consolidation	of	the	elites,	and	keeping	the	potential	for	protest	in	
society	at	a	low	level.
The	most	important	challenges	include:
An intensified fight for influence and assets within the elite. There	 is	
growing	tension	within	Russia’s	ruling	elite,	triggered	both	by	the	shrinking	
amount	of	resources	to	be	shared,	and	the	uncertainty	of	the	existing	infor-
mal	rules	of	 the	game	which	define	the	boundaries	of	acceptable	behaviour	
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for	the	government’s	representatives.	This	is	leading	to	a	sense	of	insecurity	
among	the	elite,	both	of	person	and	property,	because	the	opacity	and	unpre-
dictability	of	the	Kremlin’s	decisions	is	rising;	this	is	clear,	for	example,	in	the	
unprecedented	strengthening	of	the	Rosneft	oil	company’s	CEO,	Igor	Sechin,	
at	the	expense	of	other	representatives	of	the	elites	who	have	also	been	loyal	
to	the	Kremlin.	The	circle	of	the	system’s	main	beneficiaries,	those	who	have	
enriched	themselves	from	corruption,	has	also	been	shrinking;	a	series	of	its	
members	who	have	been	the	biggest	burdens	on	the	Putin	model	have	dropped	
out	of	it,	such	as	Vladimir	Yakunin,	head	of	the	railways,	and	Andrei	Belya-
ninov,	 the	 former	head	of	 the	customs	service.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	elite’s	
sense	 of	 security	 is	 being	 reduced	 by	 external	 factors:	Western	 (especially	
US)	 sanctions	 are	 gradually	 limiting	 their	 ability	 to	 secure	 their	 interests	
beyond	Russia’s	borders.	On	the	one	hand,	this	is	making	Russian	oligarchs	
ever	more	dependent	on	the	Kremlin,	but	on	the	other	it	is	increasing	their	
discontent.	In	this	situation,	the	Kremlin	has	offered	compensation	(financial	
support),	but	only	to	Putin’s	innermost	circle	(including	lucrative	state	con-
tracts	for	the	Rotenberg	family),	and	not	to	others.	The	wider	elite,	including	
businesses	outside	the	narrow	circle,	are	thus	bearing	the	costs	of	maintain-
ing	the	current	system	to	a	much	greater	degree,	fighting	among	themselves	
over	the	corrupt	income	from	the	state	budget,	and	sometimes	falling	victim	
to	the	machinations	of	the	special	services.	The	stakes	in	this	game	are	being	
raised	by	the	context	of	the	presidential	election,	which	will	be	accompanied	
by	an	at	least	partial	rotation	of	the	senior	state	positions,	as	well	as	a	rivalry	
for	the	best	sinecures.
In	this	context,	Putin’s effectiveness as an arbiter comes into question	 in	
the rivalry	among	interest	groups;	up	until	now,	this	had	guaranteed	the	sta-
bility	of	the	system.	The	disturbance	which	has	been	observed	in	the	propor-
tional	allocation	of	the	financial	benefits,	the	significant	boost	to	the	position	of	
Igor	Sechin,	the	head	of	Rosneft,	at	the	expense	of	the	more	liberally-oriented	
factions	in	the	establishment,	as	well	as	the	fairly	wide	mandate	granted	to	the	
Federal	Security	Service	(FSB)	in	its	investigations	into	corruption	among	the	
members	of	the	elite,	may	testify	to	Putin’s	gradually	decreasing	involvement	
in	maintaining	the	balance	between	the	factions.	This	poses	a	potential	chal-
lenge	with	regard	to	the	possible	effects	on	the	position	of	the	President	within	
the	balance	of	forces	after	2018.
The effects of the personalisation of power.	 Since	 2000	 Russia	 has	 been	
witnessing	a	progressive	centralisation	of	power,	relying	on	the	construction	
at	 the	 federal	 level	 of	 a	hierarchised	 ‘power	vertical’	 (вертикаль),	with	 the	
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presidential	team	at	its	head,	together	with	a	gradual	reduction	of	the	regions’	
competences	with	regard	to	the	centre.	This	has	been	accompanied	by	a	depre-
ciation	of	the	formal	institutional	system	in	favour	of	informal	arrangements	
and	factional	games;	the	excessive	bureaucratisation	of	the	management	mod-
el;	 the	conscious	multiplication	of	non-transparent	and	unstable	 legislation;	
and	 the	selection	of	personnel	on	 the	basis	of	corruption	and	nepotism.	The	
result	is	a	lack	of	automaticity	within	the	governmental	system:	the	President	
personally	 resolves	 issues	 arising	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 government	 (his	 in-
terventions	are	also	often	the	only	deterrent	to	the	corrupt	and	incompetent	
elites,	as	the	media	take	care	to	report).	This	strengthens	his	image	as	the	sole	
guarantor	of	order,	although	it	also	means	that	the	Kremlin	does	not	exercise	
complete	 control	 over	 the	 various	 segments	 of	 the	 system:	 out	 of	 necessity,	
such	interventions	are	limited	to	matters	of	particular	importance,	or	which	
have	particular	resonance	in	the	media,	but	nevertheless	they	still	do	not	re-
duce	the	risk	of	uncontrolled	growth	in	social	discontent.
No reliable diagnosis of social sentiments in the context of the system’s 
failures in governing the state.	The	opposition	figure	Aleksei	Navalny’s	suc-
cessful	mobilisation	of	the	Russian	people’s	potential	for	political	protest	on	
the	basis	 of	 anti-corruption	 slogans	was	met	by	 the	Kremlin	with	 surprise	
and	alarm.	Although	the	scale	of	the	protests,	and	even	more	so	public	support	
for	Navalny	himself,	is	objectively	small,	in	favourable	conditions	his	charis-
ma	and	 strong	political	 instinct	 could	break	 the	 existing	paradigm	of	 rela-
tions	between	the	authoritarian	government	and	the	passive	public.	Although	
the	Kremlin	has	repeatedly	proved	its	effectiveness	at	neutralising	public	pro-
tests,	 either	 through	 repression	 or	 by	 selectively	meeting	 the	material	 and	
ideological	needs	of	certain	electoral	groups	(as	is	demonstrated	by	the	silenc-
ing	and	channelling	of	 the	protest	potential	manifested	 in	2011–12	by	using	
the	rhetoric	of	mobilisation	and	defence	related	to	the	annexation	of	Crimea),	
the	real	challenge	lies	in	guarding	itself	in	the	future	from	making	errors	in	
diagnosing	the	situation	and	‘crisis	management’.	Such	errors	may	result	both	
from	an	absence	of	fully	credible	sociological	tools	to	measure	the	potential	
discontent	 of	 the	population,	 and	 the	probability	of	 its	 transformation	 into	
active	forms	of	protest,	as	well	as	an	inadequate	reaction	by	the	authorities	as	
a	result	of	either	incompetence,	or	a	disproportionate	and	thus	counterpro-
ductive	application	of	repression.
This	 involves the risk that the potential for protest with an economic 
background could rise, in	connection	with	 the	deepening	pauperisation	of	
Putin’s	traditional	electorate	(state	employees,	pensioners,	the	working	class).	
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Because	of	the	economic	problems,	the	model	of	the	relationship	between	the	
state	and	the	public	–	which	relied	mainly	on	assuring	the	citizens	of	steadily	
rising	incomes	as	well	as	a	fairly	high	level	of	social	security,	in	exchange	for	
their	unconditional	political	support	–	has	now	been	exhausted.	Protests	with	
a	socioeconomic	basis	by	groups	regarded	as	the	government’s	social	backbone	
are	more	dangerous	for	the	Kremlin	than	the	mobilisation	of	the	middle	class	
around	slogans	calling	for	the	democratisation	or	liberalisation	of	the	system.	
So	far,	the	authorities	have	managed	to	keep	such	protests	to	the	level	of	small,	
scattered	outbreaks.	However,	if	a	wave	of	such	protests	flooded	the	whole	of	
Russia	(for	example,	as	a	result	of	the	further	deterioration	of	the	population’s	
financial	situation	in	connection	with	the	failure	of	the	economic	model),	the	
Kremlin	may	run	out	of	operational	and	material	resources	to	use	in	repress-
ing	or	neutralising	them.	The	discontent	may	be	exacerbated	by	a	rise	in	ethnic	
tensions	caused	by	an	increased	influx	of	immigrants	from	Central	Asia	(due	
to	the	deficit	of	labour	in	Russia).
3. Prospects
The	challenges	outlined	above	do not at present seem to pose a serious risk 
to the stability of the system,	although	they	will	certainly	affect	domestic	
policy	in	Russia	during	the	period	2018–24.	The	dynamics	of	the	situation	will	
be	shaped	on	the	basis	of	three	main	factors:
1. plans for Putin’s future position (after 2024) within the system, and the con-
stitutional changes associated with them;
2. the situation in the federal and regional ruling elites;
3. the dynamics of the public mood.
The introduction of constitutional changes allowing Putin to remain in 
the highest office in the country after 2024 should be considered the most 
likely scenario.	These	will	be	accompanied	by	a	strengthening	of	his	symbolic	
status	as	the	leader	and	sole	guarantor	of	order.	Currently	it	seems	that	only	
poor	health	could	encourage	Putin	to	push	through	any	kind	of	succession	sce-
nario.	However,	such	a	move	would	be	firmly	based	on	iron-cast	guarantees	
of	financial	and	personal	security	for	Putin	himself	as	well	as	his	inner	circle.	
The	Kremlin’s	 strategy	 in	 this	 area	 is	 likely	 to	 crystallise	no	earlier	 than	 in	
the	middle	of	his	current	presidential	term	(perhaps	during	the	parliamentary	
elections	in	2021).
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With	regard	to	Putin’s	fourth	term,	the collapse of the system does not seem 
likely	(the	benefits	of	maintaining	the	system	are	still	greater	than	the	costs,	
both	in	the	eyes	of	the	elite	and	the	general	public,	who	fear	what	might	hap-
pen	during	an	‘interregnum’),	although manifestations of its gradual desta-
bilisation may appear in isolated areas as	a	result	of	the	system’s	inability	to	
cope	with	the	challenges	outlined	above.	Any	change	in	the	potential	for	desta-
bilisation	arising	from	the	situation	among	the	elite	and	the	public	will	largely	
depend	on	Russia’s	economic	health.	This	will	determine	the	Kremlin’s	ability	to	
meet	the	financial	appetites	of	the	establishment	and	neutralise	the	social	prob-
lems	of	the	general	population.	The	predictions	of	long-term	stagnation,	how-
ever,	mean	that	we	should	expect	the	current	economic	problems	to	continue.
The government will not opt for any systemic reforms,	despite	Putin’s	use	
in	his	 election	campaign	of	 slogans	about	modernisation,	digital	 technology	
and	the	planned	‘leap	forward	in	development’.	These	would	require	real	po-
litical	changes,	and	the	Putin	elite	will	try	to	block	any	changes	that	could	un-
dermine	the	current	autocratic	style	of	managing	the	state	and	the	economy,	
thanks	to	which	it	has	access	to	the	state’s	financial	resources.	The priority 
will therefore be to maintain the system,	 indicating	the	need	to	continue	
the	current	repressive	domestic	policy	as	 the	agent	binding	 it	 together.	This	
will	consist,	on	the	one	hand,	of	‘disciplining’	the	elites	to	enforce	their	loyalty	
and	acceptance	of	the	changes	to	the	rules	of	the	game	(narrowing	the	circle	
of	beneficiaries),	also	with	the	help	of	the	law	enforcement	authorities;	and	on	
the	other,	of	ramping	up	the	government’s	course	 in	the	spheres	of	 ideology	
and	civil	rights	(the	trend	towards	continuing	to	‘seal	off’	the	legal	system	with	
the	aim	of	universalising	criminal	penalties	for	any	criticism	of	the	system	in	
the	public	sphere).
In	the	coming	years,	we	should not expect any serious threats to the sta-
bility of the system from the general public,	which	will	remain	the	object,	
and	not	the	subject	of	politics	in	the	state.	Despite	the	possibility	of	a	gradual	
expansion	within	Russia	of	active	social	opposition	to	the	status	quo	(and	de-
spite	the	presence	of	groups	consistently	demanding	political	alternatives	to	
Putinism),	this	opposition	will	still	remain	a	minority	interest.	Its	activation	
on	a	more	significant	scale	 is	more	 likely	to	occur	 in	response	to	serious	er-
rors	by	 the	authorities	 in	 the	management	of	 the	 socio-economic	 sphere,	 or	
introducing	social	reforms	painful	to	the	public,	determined	by	budgetary	fac-
tors	(such	as	raising	the	retirement	age).	It	is	far	less	likely	that	there	would	
be	a	spontaneous	manifestation	of	grassroots	mobilisation	in	opposition	to	the	
political	and	economic	substance	of	the	Putin	model.	The risks linked with 
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an escalation of public dissatisfaction will	be	deepened	by	the	state’s	policy	
of	limiting	funding	for	social	assistance	planned	for	the	next	few	years,	which	
is	to	be	targeted	or	ad hoc	in	nature	(see	part	II.	Economy).	
However, in	 the	 Kremlin’s	 perception,	maintaining the Putin model de-
pends not on the prosperity and prospects of the public, but first of all 
on the sentiments within the key groups of the elite,	which	constitute	the	
real	base	for	the	Kremlin.	The	members	of	the	elite,	who	may	expect	serious	
personnel	reshuffles	after	the	elections	and	constitutional	changes,	will	seek	
new	places	for	themselves	within	the	evolving	system,	something	which	could 
lead to a significant increase in its turbulence.	The	question	remains	of	how	
Putin’s	own	position	will	evolve.	If	he	does	not	assure	a	long-term	balance	of	
influences	among	the	interest	groups,	his	position	as	an	arbiter	may	be	chal-
lenged,	and	he	may	be	considered	a	greater	threat	to	the	security	of	the	elite	
than	any	power	struggle	after	his	departure	might	be.
One	response	to	the	possible	escalation	of	tensions	in	the	elite	may	be	a contin-
uation of the	process of	replacing high-level personnel	which	has	been	initi-
ated	in	recent	years:	that	is,	their	rejuvenation	and	‘technocratisation’	(i.e.	depo-
liticisation),	as	was	seen	in	the	gubernatorial	nominations	during	2017	among	
other	instances.	Putin’s	friends	and	other	strong	leaders	will	continue	to	be	re-
placed	by	‘technical	managers’	who	do	not	have	their	own	political	bases.	This	
new	generation	of	‘managers’	will	be	much	more	likely	to	accept	the	new	rules	
of	the	game	(i.e.	reduced	opportunities	for	getting	rich	on	the	scale	practiced	
by	the	older	generations	of	the	elite).	This	will	not	only	allow	the	Kremlin	more	
control	over	the	elite,	but	also	(at	least	partially)	permit	a	streamlining	of	the	
administrative	apparatus	and	the	refreshment	of	its	image:	the	charismatic	le-
gitimation	of	the	leader	will	thus	be	supplemented	by	legitimacy	of	the	system	
as	a	whole,	based	on	raising	the	efficiency	of	the	bureaucracy.	The	lack	of	funda-
mental	systemic	reforms,	however,	will	maintain	the	malaise	and	fossilisation	
of	the	system,	which	the	personnel	changes	will	fail	to	mask	in	the	long	run.	
Paradoxically, shoring up the political sphere threatens to increase the 
unpredictability of the functioning of the system of government,	which	
thus	may	lose	its	ability	to	adapt	to	emerging	challenges.
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II. THE Economy
1. The present state of affairs
The	raw-materials	economy	model
Russia’s economic successes during Putin’s rule, especially during his 
first two terms, were closely connected with a rise in the prices of natu-
ral raw materials, mainly crude oil.	The	flow	of	petrodollars	and	the	spare	
production	capacity	after	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	gave	impetus	to	Rus-
sia’s	dynamic	growth	at	the	beginning	of	Putin’s	rule.	
Figure 4. Russia’s rise in GDP against the background of oil prices
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Source: the Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru, 2018; Rosstat, www.gks.ru
Russia’s dependency on the energy sector has risen over the last 18 years 
(apart	from	periods	of	crises).	The oil and gas industries in particular have 
gained economic and political strategic importance.	Russia	is	a	key	global	
oil	 and	gas	producer	 (see	Appendix	3).	 In	2017	budget	 revenue	 from	 the	 en-
ergy	sector	accounted	for	40%	of	all	budget	revenues,	compared	to	18%	in	1999 
(which	was	connected	not	only	with	the	high	prices	of	crude	oil,	but	also	an	
increase	in	the	volume	of	exports).	The	share	of	oil	and	gas	in	Russian	exports	
exceeded	60%	in	2017	(compared	to	45%	in	1999).	
The	dynamic	flow	of	petrodollars	to	Russia	in	the	period	2000–17	contributed	
to	an	 increase	of	GDP	of	over	75%.	During	 this	 time,	budgetary	expenditure	
nominally	rose	by	a	factor	of	12;	this	allowed	an	increase	in	expenditure,	par-
ticularly	on	defence	(nominally	from	$5	billion	to	over	$50	billion	in	current	
prices),	which	 strengthened	Russia’s	 position	 on	 the	 international	 arena,	 as	
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well	as	on	social	policy,	which	guaranteed	public	support	for	the	Russian	gov-
ernment	(see	Appendix	4).	During	this	time,	the	real	income	of	the	population	
increased	by	around	240%.	
Figure 5. The share of revenue from exports of energy resources in the Rus-
sian budget, year on year, and the share of the energy sector in Russia’s GDP 
(in percent, in 2000–16)
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data published by the Russian Ministry of Energy, 
www.minenergo.gov.ru; the Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru; Rosstat, www.gks.ru
The	petrodollars	flowing	into	Russia	led	to	an increase in the central bank’s 
gold and currency reserves, and after 2004, the government’s reserves as 
well;	the	latter	were	collected	in	special	funds	(initially	the	Stabilisation	Fund,	
and	from	2008	the	Reserve	Fund	and	the	National	Prosperity	Fund).	The	accu-
mulated	funding	made	it	possible	to	successfully	pay	off	the	state’s	foreign	debt,	
thereby	reducing	it	to	around	5%	of	GDP	by	the	end	of	2017	(although	Russia’s	
total	foreign	debt,	both	state	and	private,	amount	to	35%	of	GDP),	compared	to	
60%	in	2000.	During	the	economic	crises	in	2009	and	2015,	these	funds	allowed	
the	Russian	authorities	to	stabilise	public	finances,	and	spared	them	the	neces-
sity	of	implementing	severe	reforms.	As	a	result,	by	the	end	of	2017	the	Reserve	
Fund	had	been	exhausted,	and	the	government’s	total	financial	reserves	were	
reduced	to	$65	billion.	
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Figure 6. Russian financial reserves 
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Source: Central Bank of Russia, www.cbr.ru, 2018; the Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru, 2018
The	state’s	dominant	role	in	the	economy
At	the	end	of	his	first	presidential	term,	Putin	initiated processes aimed at 
strengthening the role of the state in the economy and limiting the func-
tioning of market mechanisms in Russia.
Above	all,	there has been a process of renationalisation and concentration 
of assets around state entities	(currently	the	state’s	share	of	the	economy	is	
about	70%	of	GDP).	These	processes	have	primarily	taken	place	in	the	energy	
sector.	The	state’s	dominance	in	the	gas	sector	was	enabled	by	the	takeover	of	
a	controlling	percentage	of	shares	in	Gazprom,	and	granting	it	the	exclusive	
right	 to	export	gas	via	 the	country’s	pipeline	system.	 In	 turn,	 the	Kremlin’s	
influence	in	the	petroleum	sector	was	built	up	thanks	to	the	takeover	of	pri-
vate	assets	by	the	state-owned	company	Rosneft.	The	state	also	strengthened	
its	position	in	the	economy	by	creating	public	corporations	such	as	Rostec	(the	
machinery	 sector,	 including	 the	arms	 industry)	 and	Rosatom	(nuclear	pow-
er),	 and	by	consolidating	 the	banking	 sector	 (state	participation	 in	 this	 sec-
tor	exceeded	80%	at	the	beginning	of	2018).	The	Kremlin	has	also	consistently	
strengthened	its	control	over	private	business,	for	example,	by	undermining	
property	rights	(see	the	nationalisation	of	Yukos	and	Bashneft).	
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Figure 7. The share of state companies in the production of Russian oil in 
2004 and 2017 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data published by CDU TEK (www.cdu.ru) from 2000 to 2018
The Russian President plays a key role in the decision-making processes 
relating to the strategic sectors of the economy,	and	the	heads	of	the	state	
companies	(whom	he	appoints)	have	become	an	important	element	of	the	busi-
ness	and	political	elites	of	contemporary	Russia.	As	a	result,	a	system	has	been	
created	in	which	the	activity	of	the	state-owned	giants	is	focused	not	so	much	
on	increasing	the	efficiency	of	their	business,	as	much	as	achieving	the	goals	
of	the	Kremlin,	including	social	(keeping	workers	employed)	and	geopolitical	
tasks	(investing	in	infrastructure	projects,	see	Appendix	5),	as	well	as	the	par-
ticular	objectives	of	the	ruling	elite	as	they	get	rich	from	the	implementation	of	
costly	investments	(in	2017,	95%	of	state	contracts	for	goods	and	services	were	
awarded	to	suppliers	without	any	tenders	being	held).
In	 addition,	 the process of	Russia’s integration with the world economy 
which	had	been observed	during	Putin’s	first	two	terms	has been reversed.	
Russia’s	aggressive	foreign	policy	and	the	hardening	of	Russia’s	negotiating	po-
sition	on	the	principles	of	cooperation	with	the	West	has	led	 inter alia	 to	the	
suspension	of	talks	with	the	EU	on	a	new	Partnership	and	Cooperation	Agree-
ment,	as	well	as	the	suspension	of	Russia’s	process	of	accession	to	the	OECD.	In	
addition	Russia	has	strengthened	its	protectionist	policy,	despite	its	accession	
to	the	World	Trade	Organisation	in	2012;	and	since	2014	the	country’s	isolation	
has	also	deepened	 thanks	 to	Western	sanctions,	as	well	as	Russia’s	counter-
sanctions	and	its	programme	of	import	substitution.
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2. The main challenges
The	main	 economic	 challenge	 for	 the	 Russian	 government	 remains	 the ex-
haustion of the present raw material-based model of economic develop-
ment.	This	 is	mostly	predicated	on	external	 factors	over	which	 the	Russian	
authorities	have	limited	influence:	fluctuations	of	prices,	and	trends	on	export	
markets	which	do	not	favour	Russia.	The	degree	to	which	Russia	is	dependent	
on	the	prices	on	global	markets,	as	well	as	 the	fragility	of	 the	basis	 for	Rus-
sia’s	economic	growth,	were	revealed	by	 the	collapse	of	oil	prices	at	 the	end	
of	2008	(falling	below	$40/bbl)	and	at	the	turn	of	2015	(when	they	fell	below	
$30/bbl),	 leading	to	serious	economic	crises.	However,	the	exhaustion	of	the	
raw-material	economic	model	was	already	apparent	in	2013,	when	growth	in	
Russia	came	to	a	standstill	despite	the	high	oil	prices.
Another	challenge	for	Moscow	remains	the	negative trends on the energy 
markets,	including	the	European	market	which	is	strategically	important	for	
Russia.	This	particularly	 concerns	 the	 rapidly	 changing	 situation	 in	 the	 gas	
sector.	It	is	true	that	Russia	has	managed	to	maintain	a	relatively	high	level	of	
participation	on	the	European	gas	market	(around	30%),	although	the	changes	
taking	place	in	Europe	(especially	within	the	EU)	have	made	the	interdepend-
ence	of	Russia	and	Europe	more	evenly	balanced.	Firstly,	this	shift	has	been	
caused	by	 regulatory	 changes,	 in	particular	 the	 so-called	 energetic	 liberali-
sation	packages,	as	well	as	the	enforcement	of	the	EU	competition	rules	(the	
initiation	 in	 2012	 of	 antitrust	 proceedings	 against	 Gazprom).	 Secondly,	 the	
attempts	EU	member	states	have	made	to	diversify	their	supply	sources	have	
been	important,	in	particular,	the	development	of	infrastructure	allowing	im-
ports	of	LNG.	Thirdly,	 industry	forecasts	of	 increased	consumption	of	gas	 in	
Europe	have	been	modified	to	the	detriment	of	Russia.	Russia’s	dependence	on	
the	European	gas	market	has	been	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	Moscow has so 
far not succeeded in significantly diversifying its export markets.	In	ad-
dition,	as	a	result	of	Russia’s	aggression	against	Ukraine,	Gazprom	has	lost	its	
largest	market	(Ukraine	still	imported	59	bcm	of	gas	from	Russia	in	2006).
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
27
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
3/
20
18
Figure 8. Export of Russian gas to target markets, 2005–16 (in bcm)
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data published by Gazprom, www.gazprom.ru 
The	 situation	 on	 the	Asian	markets,	which	Moscow	had	 seen	 as	 promising,	
is	also	evolving	unfavourably	 for	Russia.	Although	 in	2016	Russia	succeeded	
in	obtaining	 the	status	of	China’s	main	oil	 supplier,	 the	 increasing	competi-
tion	among	exporters,	changes	in	energy	policy	(aimed	at	strengthening	the	
participation	of	gas	in	the	energy	mix,	at	the	expense	of	oil	and	coal),	and	the	
economic	downturn	are	all	challenging	this	idea.	In	turn,	the	Asian	countries	
are	meeting	their	growing	gas	demand	on	the	basis	of	a	diversified	portfolio	of	
supplies	(Japan	is	primarily	using	LNG,	and	China	uses	both	LNG	and	gas	im-
ported	via	pipelines,	particularly	from	Central	Asia),	which	will	hinder	Mos-
cow	in	its	competition	for	new	outlets	for	Russian	gas.
Another	 potential	 challenge	 to	Russia	 remains	 the	 sanctions policy of the 
West, especially the United States.	Russia	has	managed	to	overcome	the	con-
sequences	of	the	existing	sanctions	and	stabilise	its	financial	sector;	however,	
some	potential	new	restrictions	from	Washington	could	strike	a	serious	blow	
at	the	Russian	economy.
The Russian authorities will have to also deal with internal problems, es-
pecially with their aging society.	According	to	Rosstat,	in	December	2017	the	
size	of	the labour	force	in	Russia	was	estimated	at	76.5	million,	i.e.	52%	of	the	
total	 population	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation.	 According	 to	 current	 estimates,	
the	labour	market	will	be	reduced	by	around	800,000–900,000	people	annu-
ally.	At	 the	 current	 low	 level	of	unemployment	 in	Russia	 (5.2%	 in	2017),	 the	
labour	market	is	already	operating	on	the	border	of	a	deficit,	and	the	working	
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people	who	could	ensure	the	development	of	the	Russian	economy	are	absent.	
In	addition,	an	ageing	society	means	increased	expenditure	on	pensions	and	
social	&	health	support.	In	2017	there	were	c.	44	million	pensioners	in	Russia	
(around	30%	of	the	country’s	citizens);	the	retirement	age	is	currently	55	years	
for	women	and	60	for	men	(with	an	estimated	average	life	expectancy	of	77	and	
67	years	respectively),	and	the	total	payments	from	the	Pension	Fund	amount-
ed	to	almost	$150	billion	(i.e.	more	than	9%	of	GDP)	in	2017,	almost	45%	of	which	
were	transfers	from	the	federal	budget.	The	financing	of	the	pension	system	
is	a	serious	challenge	for	the	authorities,	who	have	already	resorted	to	special	
measures,	including	topping	up	the	pension	fund	from	the	National	Prosperity	
Fund	(around	$11	billion	were	transferred	for	this	purpose	in	2017).
Figure 9. Russia’s population structure by age 
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Another	major	problem facing	the	Russian	authorities	is	the shortage of in-
vestment, which	 is essential	 for	 boosting	 Russian	 growth.	This	 absence	 is	
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inhibiting	the	increase	in	labour	productivity	which	would	partially solve	the	
labour	shortage	problem.	Investments	in	Russia	have	remained	at	a	low	level	
since	 2013,	 and	 the	 amount	 actually	 fell	 in	 2014–16.	The	 low	 level	 of	 invest-
ments	in	Russia	is	associated	on	the	one	hand	with	limited	access	to	capital,	
in	connection	with	the	crisis	which	the	Russian	economy	fell	into	in	2014,	as	
well	as	the	Western	sanctions.	On	the	other	hand,	business’s	unwillingness	to	
invest	is	the	result	of	the	weak	investment	climate	in	Russia,	and	the	low	as-
sessment	of	prospects	for	the	Russian	economy’s	development.	The	uncertainty	
of	property	rights,	corruption	and	the	state’s	domination	of	 the	economy	all	
discourage	business	from	getting	involved	in	projects	with	long-term	returns.	
In	addition,	the	impaired	mechanisms	for	competition	mean	that	the	invest-
ment	projects	which	are	implemented	in	Russia	are	much	more	expensive	and	
not	very	efficient.	Consequently,	over	the	past	18	years	(apart	from	2006–07)	
Russia	has	seen	a	net	outflow	of	capital	(see	Appendix	6).	Foreign	investments	
entering	Russia	 in	 that	period,	meanwhile,	have	been	focused	 in	 the	energy	
sector,	confirming	the	Russian	economy’s	dependence	on	it.
Figure 10. Increase in investments in core capital (change in percent)
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3. Prospects
We should not expect during Putin’s fourth term that Russia will free it-
self from its dependence on raw materials	and	the	variance	in	prices	on	the	
global	markets.	The	experiences	of	the	last	18	years	show	that	the	ruling	elite	
is	averse	to	deep	and	comprehensive	economic	and	political	reforms,	without	
which	it	will	be	impossible	to	create	new,	stable	sources	of	growth	for	Russia.	
The	shape	of	economic	policy	will	be	most	influenced,	first	and	foremost,	by	the	
interests	of	the	individual	members	of	Putin’s	elite.	Their	actions	so	far	show	
that	 they	will	 try	 to	 block	 any	 changes	 that	would	 undermine	 the	 current	
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autocratic	style	of	managing	the	state	and	the	economy,	thanks	to	which	they	
have	access	to	the	state’s	financial	resources.
At the same time, another economic collapse is unlikely.	This	is	due	to	rel-
atively	 favourable	external	 factors;	most	 forecasts	expect	oil	prices	 to	remain	
within	a	range	of	$50–70/bbl.	 In	addition,	the	government	is	conducting	a	re-
strictive	fiscal	policy.	The	budget	for	2018–20	is	based	on	conservative	estimates	
of	the	average	price	of	crude	oil,	at	around	$40/bbl,	as	well	as	a	planned	reduc-
tion	 of	 budgetary	 expenditure,	 including	 social	 policy	 and	 defence	 (although	
this	will	not	affect	the	status	of	the	Russian	army’s	combat	readiness).	If	crude	
oil	prices	rise,	any	surplus	income	will	be	allocated	to	the	National	Prosperity	
Fund,	which	will	increase	the	government’s	room	for	manoeuvre,	allowing	it	to	
increase	spending	on	selected	projects	(including	ad hoc	interventions	in	the	so-
cial	sphere,	or	limiting	the	negative	consequences	of	possible	new	US	sanctions).
It is unlikely that the unfavourable trends for Russia on the European en-
ergy market will change.	As	a	consequence,	Moscow’s	plans	for	a	significant	
increase	in	exports	to	Europe	(particularly	in	the	gas	sector)	seem	unrealistic.	
However, Russia is likely to succeed in implementing its key infrastruc-
ture projects	intended	for	the	export	of	gas	onto	the	European	market,	in	par-
ticular	the	Nord	Stream	2	(if	the	project	does	not	lose	the	political	support	of	
Germany,	or	is	not	covered	by	US	sanctions)	and	Turkish	Stream	gas	pipelines,	
which	will	allow	it	to	further	diversify	its	supply	routes.
At	the	same	time,	contrary	to	Russian	declarations,	the Chinese market will 
not become an alternative to Europe in the context of gas supplies.	The	
probable	activation	of	the	‘Power	of	Siberia’	gas	pipeline	and	the	inauguration	
of	deliveries	to	China	(expected	at	the	turn	of	2020)	will	only	involve	minor	
quantities	of	gas;	the	implementation	of	other	Asian	projects	seems	unrealistic	
at	the	moment.	However,	Russia	is	likely	to	retain	its	status	as	an	important	
supplier	of	crude	oil	to	China.
The	state’s	burdens	linked	to	the	need	to	finance	its	pension	and	social	policy	
will most	likely	force the authorities to take certain actions with the aim of 
improving the efficiency of the current system.	Social	policy	remains	one	of	
the	main	priorities	of	the	Russian	budget,	and	it	will	absorb	the	majority	of	the	
funding	 (around	30%	of	 total	expenditure).	The	changes	 implemented,	how-
ever,	will	probably	be	tactical	and	selective	in	nature.	In	the	next	few	years,	we	
should	expect	the	continuation	of	the	process	of	reforming social assistance 
observed	over	the	last	three	years	(including	the	further	elimination	of	reliefs,	
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subsidies	for	selected	goods	including	medicine,	and	the	creation	of	a	system	to	
support	the	most	needy),	as	well	as	cuts	to	the	pension	system	(most	likely	by	
raising	the	retirement	age	and	reforming	the	distribution	of	social	benefits).	
Russia’s	budget	for	2020	includes	a	plan	to	reduce	expenditure	on	social	policy	
to	around	4.4%	of	GDP	(the	figure	was	5.5%	in	2017).	These	new	measures	are	
likely	to	be	introduced	gradually,	in	order	to	minimise	social	discontent	and	
not	test	the	patience	of	the	Russian	public	excessively.	However,	 if	oil	prices	
rise	higher	(well	above	$40/bbl),	the	government	will	have	an	opportunity	to	
increase	its	expenditure	on	social	spending.
We should not expect any real changes to improve the investment climate 
in Russia, such	as	 limiting	 the	state’s	participation	 in	 the	economy	and	 the	
influence	of	officials	on	business,	or	guarantees	of	property	 rights.	Nor	will	
there	be	any	dynamic	increase	in	private	investment	in	Russia.	The	Kremlin	
will	probably	try	to	maintain	state	support	for	selected	major	infrastructure	
projects	in	the	country,	although	the	amount	and	scale	of	financing	will	have	
to	be	adapted	to	the	shrinking	pool	of	financial	resources.
In summary, the most likely scenario for the development of the econom-
ic situation in Russia during Vladimir Putin’s fourth term is economic 
stagnation: a slight increase, but still below the global average. At the 
same time, this new variant seems to be fully acceptable to Putin’s cur-
rent elite; it allows them to retain power and maintain the country’s rela-
tive socio-economic stability.
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III. ForEIgn PolIcy
1. The current state of affairs
The	Kremlin	has	 operated	 a	policy of ‘soft revisionism’	more	 or	 less	 since	
2004,	based	on	challenging	and	weakening	the	post-Cold	War	liberal	interna-
tional	order	while	taking	advantage	of	its	benefits	in	the	economic	sphere	(ac-
cess	to	Western	markets,	capital	and	technology).	Aware	of	Russia’s	economic	
weakness	and	the	importance	of	the	relationship	with	the	West	for	the	Russian	
economy,	the	Kremlin	has	skilfully	manipulated	the	levels	of	tension	with	the	
West,	and	especially	with	the	United	States,	while	still	managing	to	avoid	an	
open	confrontation.
The strategic objectives of the Kremlin’s	foreign policy have remained un-
changed.	These	are	as	follows:
1. weakening the position of the united States: ‘dethroning’ the uS from 
its role as the ‘guarantor’ of liberal global governance;
2. revising the security order in the Euro-atlantic area, and
3. creating a regional order within the post-Soviet region, dominated by 
russia, by means including the build-up of integration structures sub-
ordinate to moscow. 
During Putin’s third presidential term (2012–18), Russia’s foreign policy 
was characterised by increased assertiveness, in comparison with the 
past, which sometimes moved into open aggression,	as	well	as	 increased	
activity	in	regions	of	the	world	(the	Middle	East,	Southeast	Asia,	Latin	Ameri-
ca)	which	had	previously	been	very	low	on	its	list	of	priorities	behind	the	Euro-
Atlantic,	post-Soviet	and	East	Asian	regions.
This	increased	assertiveness	stemmed	primarily	from	the	sense	shared	by	Pu-
tin’s	team	that	its	 legitimacy	was	weakening;	and	as	a	result,	that	it	became	
more	vulnerable	to	possible	attempts	by	Washington	to	apply	‘regime	change’	
to	Russia	itself.	Moscow’s	more	assertive	policy	was	first	of	all	intended	to	sat-
isfy	the	great-power	aspirations	of	Russia’s	public	and	elites,	and	also,	by	in-
creasing	tension	between	 itself	and	the	West,	 to	consolidate	Russian	society	
around	 the	 government.	 Second,	 this	 policy	was	 intended	 to	 accelerate	 the	
weakening	of	the	West,	and	especially	the	United	States,	and	thus	stimulate	
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the	transformation	of	the	 liberal	 international	order	 into	a	global	concert	of	
powers,	which	the	Kremlin	elite	felt	would	better	protect	Russia	from	external	
interference.
The	manifestations	of	the	assertiveness	of	Russian	foreign	policy	during	Pu-
tin’s	third	term	were	primarily	the	following:
•	 the use of military force	(the	aggression	towards	Ukraine	and	the	armed	
intervention	in	Syria);
•	 territorial conquests	(the	annexation	of	Crimea	was	Russia’s	first	territo-
rial	conquest	by	the	use	of	force	since	the	1940s);
•	 attempts	to	influence the internal politics of other states	by	using	armed	
formations,	sometimes	irregular	(as	in	Ukraine)	as	well	as	tools	of	‘infor-
mation	warfare’	(campaigns	of	propaganda	and	manipulation	in	Russian-
controlled	media,	trolling	on	social	media,	cyber-attacks),	and	financial	or	
media	support	for	anti-establishment	or	(perceived	as)	pro-Russian	politi-
cal	forces.	The most spectacular example of Russia’s ‘information war’ 
was the attempt to intervene in the US presidential campaign in 2016.	
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In	the	post-Soviet	area,	the	Kremlin has initiated attempts to deepen and 
extend the process of economic integration, as well as giving it a politi-
cal dimension	by	transforming	the	Customs	Union	(established	in	2010)	into	
the	Eurasian	Union.	It	then	undertook	an	intense	campaign	of	economic	and	
political	pressure	aimed	at	inducing	Ukraine	to	join	the	project.	Eventually,	
the	Kremlin	succeeded	in	founding	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	(EAEU)	on	
1	January	2015.	However,	its	success	has	so	far	been	very	limited.	On	the	one	
hand,	the	new	structure	meant	a	real	(and	beneficial	for	Moscow)	deepening	
of	economic	integration,	and	drew	Armenia	and	Kyrgyzstan	into	this	process,	
in	addition	to	the	members	of	the	Customs	Union	(Kazakhstan	and	Belarus).	
On	the	other	hand,	however,	Russia	failed	to	include	elements	of	political	in-
tegration	 to	 the	process	of	Eurasian	economic	 integration,	 and	 its	 attempts	
to	encourage	Kiev	to	join	the	EAEU	led	to	war	with	Ukraine	and	open	politi-
cal	 conflict	with	 the	West.	Although	 the	annexation	of	Crimea	brought	 the	
Kremlin	benefits	in	the	form	of	increased	domestic	political	legitimacy	and	an	
improved	military	position	in	the	Black	Sea	basin,	it	was	a	strategic	failure	in	
foreign	policy	terms	(see	below).
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As its conflict with the West deepened, Russia activated a global policy 
in an attempt to strengthen its bargaining position towards the West 
by developing economic, political and military relationships with non-
Western partners. This purpose was also served by its attempts to inter-
fere in regional conflicts, in order to demonstrate to the West that these 
conflicts could not be ended without the cooperation of Russia, and on 
its terms.	The	Kremlin	has	made	a	particular	effort	to	strengthen its rela-
tionship with China.	In	the	context	of	its	worsening	conflict	with	the	West,	
Russia	agreed	(after	more	than	a	decade	of	negotiations)	a	long-term	contract	
for	 the	export	of	 its	natural	 gas	and	 the	 construction	of	 a	gas	pipeline	be-
tween	the	two	countries;	it	also	agreed	to	supply	China	with	technological-
ly	advanced	weapons	systems	(S-400	air	defence	systems,	Su-35	multi-role	
fighters);	 and	 intensified	 military	 cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 countries	
(including	joint	exercises,	including	in	strategically	‘sensitive’	areas	such	as	
the	Baltic	Sea,	the	Mediterranean	Sea,	the	Sea	of	Japan	and	the	South	China	
Sea).	At	the	same	time,	Russia	began	a tactical game with Japan,	aimed	at	
expanding	their	economic	cooperation	as	well	as	the	strategic	‘uncoupling’	of	
Japan	from	the	United	States,	exploiting	Tokyo’s	desire	to	recover	the	Kuril	
Islands,	as	well	as	Japanese	concerns	at	the	power	of	China.	Russia	has	also	
undertaken	efforts	to	expand	economic	and	military-technical	cooperation	
with	the	ASEAN	countries.
Most impressive, however, has been the return of Russia as a great power 
in the Middle East.	This	comeback	is	the	result	of	a	coordinated	use	of	military	
and	diplomatic	instruments,	as	well	as	supplies	of	weapons	and	nuclear	tech-
nology.	A	key	role	was	played	by	the	introduction	of	Russian	troops	(primar-
ily	air	power	and	special	forces)	to	Syria,	and	the	(for	now)	militarily	success-
ful	intervention	in	the	civil	war	there.	This	intervention	was	accompanied	by	
diplomatic	action	which	successfully	sought	to	maintain	contacts	and	develop	
cooperation	with	the	greatest	possible	number	of	countries	in	the	region,	re-
gardless	of	which	party	they	supported	in	the	Syrian	civil	war.	In	the	context	
of	the	Syrian	conflict,	Russia	has	(with	Iran	and	Turkey)	attempted	to	create	
a	regional	 ‘concert	of	powers’.	 In	addition,	 it	has	become	a	major	partner	for	
such	regionally	important	countries	as	Egypt,	Israel,	Iraq,	and	(in	the	context	
of	 coordinating	policy	on	oil	 exports)	Saudi	Arabia.	Russia	 also	obtained	an	
important	position	for	itself	as	a	player	in	Libya.
This assertive policy has brought the Kremlin significant short-term 
benefits in internal politics.	By	annexing	Crimea,	opening	conflict	with	the	
West,	demonstrating	its	ability	to	withstand	Western	pressure	and	carrying	
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out	the	successful	‘rescue’	operation	of	the	Assad	regime	in	Syria, the Kremlin 
has managed to create a sense among the Russian public that Russia is re-
gaining or has regained the status of a great power, which automatically 
resulted in a boost in support for Putin.
2. The main challenges
Putin’s third term saw a collapse of the ‘soft revisionism’ strategy that 
had hitherto been optimal for Russia. The level of conflict with the United 
States has come dangerously close – from the Kremlin’s point of view – to 
a level where there is a risk of open and direct confrontation.	The	Krem-
lin	knows	that	it	cannot	win	such	a	confrontation	because	of	its	overall	power	
disparity	with	the	West.	
A growing problem for the Kremlin is Western, especially US sanctions 
(particularly economic),	which	are	the	price	Russia	has	paid	for	its	aggres-
sion	 towards	Ukraine.	Although	 they	are	bearable	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 in	 the	
longer	term	they	will	call	 into	question	the	model	of	Russia’s	economic	rela-
tions	with	the	West	which	has	effectively	been	operating	until	2014,	and	has	
proved	beneficial	 to	Russia’s	 elites.	 In	 this	model,	Russian	economic	entities	
essentially	had	free	access	to	the	markets	and	resources	of	the	Western	liberal	
economy,	while	Western	economic	entities’	access	to	the	Russian	market	was	
restricted	by	the	state	and	by	the	informal	mechanisms	operating	in	the	Rus-
sian	economy.	In	addition,	the	Russian	ruling	elite	realises	that	in	the	long	run,	
the	continuation	of	the	sanctions	regime	will	foster	the	growth	of	the	dispari-
ties	in	potential	between	Russia	and	its	competitors	and	partners.
The conflict Russia initiated with Ukraine in the Donbas is a major prob-
lem for the Kremlin	for	another	reason	as	well.	Considering	that	the	Russian	
goal	was	to	include	Ukraine	into	the	Moscow-controlled	integration	structures,	
the	conflict	has	in	fact	had	an	effect	completely	opposite	to	the	one	desired.	It	
has	led	to	increased	pro-European	and	anti-Russian	moods	in	Ukrainian	soci-
ety	that	make	it	impossible	for	Ukraine	to	join	such	structures	in	the	foresee-
able	future.	This	has	called	into	question	the	implementation	of	the	Eurasian	
integration	project,	which	is	key	to	Russia’s	status	as	a	great	power.
In addition, it has turned out that Russia’s non-Western partners,	who	
have	 declared	 their	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 new	multi-polar	 international	
order,	are ready to adopt a position of, at most, ‘benevolent neutrality’, 
but not to participate in the conflict on Russia’s side	in	a	situation	of	acute	
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conflict	between	Russia	and	the	West. This is also true of Moscow’s strong-
est ‘strategic partner’, namely China. Moreover,	economic	cooperation	with	
non-Western	partners	cannot	replace	access	to	Western	markets,	capital	and	
technology	for	the	Russian	economy.	At	the	same	time,	the	growing	disparity	
between	 the	potential	of	Russia	and	 that	of	China	has	condemned	Russia	 to	
the	role	of	‘junior	partner’,	which	as	a	‘lesser	evil’	compared	to	American	he-
gemony	is	acceptable	to	the	Kremlin,	but	clearly	raises	concerns	among	some	
of	the	Russian	elites.	What	is	more,	the	growth	potential	of	China	has	raised	
tensions	with	India,	until	recently	a	‘strategic	partner’	for	Russia	with	whom	
it	had	previously	had	very	good	relations,	devoid	of	significant	problems.	Now,	
in	fact,	Delhi	is	cooperating	more	closely	with	Washington	(including	in	the	
military	sphere),	which	rules	that	country	out	as	a	partner	for	Moscow’s	anti-
American	policy.
Nor is Russia’s position on the Middle East based on permanent founda-
tions.	The	armed	conflict	in	Syria	is	continuing,	and	what	is	worse,	it	threat-
ens	 to	 transform	 into	 an	 open	 clash	 between	 the	 region’s	 actors.	 Especially	
high	are	the	risks	of	an	Iranian-Israeli	conflict,	with	the	possible	participation	
of	the	United	States	on	the	side	of	Israel.	Such	a	conflict	would	automatically	
marginalise	Russia,	thereby	denying	it	the	position	of	‘principal	player’	in	the	
region	which	it	had	obtained	thanks	to	its	intervention	in	Syria.
3. Prospects
There are three possible scenarios for Russian foreign policy during Pu-
tin’s fourth presidential term: defensive-transactional, confrontational-
crisis and inertial-opportunist.
The least likely scenario is the defensive-transactional.	 This	 would	 be 
based	on trying	to	convert	Russia’s	‘geopolitical	retreat’	into	its	economic	ben-
efit,	 i.e.	by	 ‘exchanging’	geopolitical	concessions	(the	key	question	being	the	
terms	for	ending	the	war	against	Ukraine)	 for	 the	normalisation	of	political	
and	economic	relations,	and	for	obtaining	the	full	recognition	and	acceptance	
of	 the	Russian	 regime	by	 the	West.	Such	a	 scenario	 seems	 likely	only	 if	 the	
Kremlin	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	in	the	long	term	the	West’s	potential	will	
be	 strengthened	 or	 consolidated,	 and	will	 be	 used	more	 assertively	 against	
Russia,	 whose	 potential	 will	 gradually	 decline.	 An	 additional	 factor	 which	
could	turn	the	Kremlin	towards	adopting	this	variant	is	the	conviction	that	it	
will	not	be	able	to	maintain	control	of	its	domestic	situation,	and	that	the	sys-
tem	of	‘façade	democracy’	will	no	longer	function	effectively.	
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There are two other likely scenarios: the confrontational-crisis and the 
inertial-opportunist	models.	Which	one	Russia	chooses	will	be	dictated	by,	
on	the	one	hand,	its	assessment	of	the	situation,	including	the	perceived	level	
of	crisis	 in	key	Western	states	and	throughout	the	Western	community,	and	
on	the	other	hand,	by	external	factors,	in	particular	the	attitude	of	the	US	to-
wards	Russia.
The confrontational-crisis scenario	will	become	reality	when	the	Kremlin	
concludes	that	there	are	currently	no	opportunities	for	a	new	‘reset’	 in	rela-
tions	with	 the	United	States;	 that	 the	American	 economic	 sanctions	will	 be	
extended	and	painful;	 and	 the	policy	adopted	by	 the	Trump	administration	
of	strengthening	the	armed	forces,	while	the	Russian	economy	remains	stag-
nant,	will	further	increase	the	US’s	advantage	in	the	military	sphere.	
This	scenario	is	especially	likely	in	two	cases:
1. a sudden but short-term ‘window of opportunity’ in the form of a shift in the 
balance of forces in the European theatre in favour of Russia (for example, 
if the United States becomes entangled in an armed conflict in the Far East); 
2. the emergence of a clear prospect of a sudden change to the balance of power 
to the detriment of Russia, for example, if Washington introduces drastic 
economic/financial sanctions.
In	this	situation,	Putin	 is	 likely	to	opt	 to	escalate	 the	conflict	with	the	Unit-
ed	States,	and	perhaps	even	to	bring	about	a	serious	crisis,	especially	one	in-
volving	an	element	of	indirect	(proxy)	military	confrontation.	Together	with	
stronger	anti-Western	(and	especially	anti-American)	rhetoric,	such	a	scenar-
io	could,	for	example,	include	the	resumption	of	military	activities	on	a	larger	
scale	against	Ukraine,	the	intensification	of	destabilising	activities	(disinfor-
mation,	cyber-warfare,	‘hybrid’)	in	the	Balkans,	and	in	an	extreme	case,	even	
‘hybrid’	operations	backed	up	by	the	threat	of	open	military	intervention	in	
the	NATO	area	(the	Baltic	states).
The	aim	would	be	to	put	political/military/psychological	pressure	on	the	op-
posing	party	and	force	it	to	make	a	strategic	bargain,	codifying	any	Western	
concessions	in	the	form	of	a	‘new	Yalta’	agreement.	In	Moscow’s	view,	such	con-
cessions	should	include	the	recognition	of	a	Russian	sphere	of	influence	in	the	
area	of	the	CIS,	the	effective	demilitarisation	of	Central	Europe,	the	recogni-
tion	of	‘absolute	sovereignty’	inside	Russia,	and	the	maintenance	of	the	model	
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of	 ‘asymmetric’	economic	cooperation	(‘Western’	 laws	for	Russian	entities	in	
the	West,	and	‘Russian’	laws	for	Western	entities	in	Russia).
The inertial-opportunist	model	 is	 also	 possible,	 especially	 if	 the	 Kremlin	
decides	 that	 the	domestic	 situation	 in	Russia	 is	 and	will	 remain	 sufficiently	
stable,	and	that	there	are	chances	to	normalise	relations	with	the	West	without	
the	need	for	Russia	to	make	any	concessions.
This	scenario	would	be	based	on	a	continuation	of	the	policy	which	has	been	
adopted	since	the	end	of	the	acute	phase	of	the	war	with	Ukraine	(since	Feb-
ruary	2015).	It	would	be	predicated	on	the	fatigue	of	the	West	and	the	growth	
of	symptoms	of	the	Western	community’s	internal	crisis,	as	well	as	upon	the	
aggressive	 exploitation	 of	 emerging	 opportunities	 to	 demonstrate	 Russia’s	
military	abilities,	its	potential	to	harm	Western	interests,	and	to	create	prob-
lems	for	whose	resolution	Russia	would	be	essential.	The main objective of 
such a policy would be to limit conflict with the West, and especially the 
United States, without losing the ‘assets’ acquired by Russia in 2014–16. 
The ideal from the Kremlin’s point of view would be to force the West to 
accept Russia’s ‘acquisitions’ and to return the relationship (especially in 
the economic sphere) to the state it was before 2014.
To achieve this goal, the Kremlin will paradoxically use the methods of 
manipulating a ‘limited’ conflict with the West.	 It	will	 thus	 continue	 to	
take	measures	to	undermine	the	political	and	economic	position	of	the	West,	
and	especially	the	United	States,	in	the	Middle	East,	the	Balkans,	East	Asia	and	
Latin	America.	As	before,	this	will	involve	supporting	countries	and	regimes	
which	for	a	variety	of	reasons	are	in	conflict	with	Washington	or	Brussels.	This	
support	may	take	the	form	of	diplomatic	action,	the	supply	of	weapons,	and	in	
exceptional	cases	making	financial	loans	or	economic	agreements.	We	should	
also	 expect	 to	 see	 Russia	 undertaking	 information	warfare,	 based	 on	 caus-
ing	or	aggravating	internal	or	international	conflicts	which	could	backfire	on	
Western	interests.
In this scenario, the Kremlin would continue its existing strategy to-
wards Ukraine in order to force it to implement the Minsk agreements 
in their Russian interpretation, which	 are	 intended	 to	 bring	 about	 the	
creation	 of	 constitutional	 tools	 allowing	 Russia	 to	 block	 Ukraine’s	 integra-
tion	with	 the	West	 (through	 an	 ‘autonomous’	Donbas	wielding	 influence	 on	
Ukraine’s	domestic	and	foreign	policy).	In	particular,	the	Kremlin	would	try	
to	exploit	the	West’s	growing	fatigue	with	the	Ukrainian-Russian	conflict	and	
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its	disappointment	at	the	lack	of	reform	in	Ukraine	to	convince	it	to	put	pres-
sure	on	Kiev.	Due	to	the	importance	of	Ukraine	for	the	Kremlin,	both	from	the	
point	of	view	of	its	reintegration	into	the	post-Soviet	space	ambitions	and	its	
domestic	policy	(Russia’s	elites	and	public	believe	that	most	of	Ukraine	is	part	
of	Russia’s	patrimony),	the	Ukraine	question	is	the	one	where	the	Kremlin	will	
be	least	willing	to	make	significant	concessions	(i.e.	by	agreeing	to	eliminate	
the	para-states	created	by	the	separatists	in	Donbas	and	returning	these	ter-
ritories	to	genuine	Ukrainian	state	control).	
An important element of the Russian strategy in both these last two sce-
narios (the confrontational-crisis and the inertial-opportunist) is predi-
cated on a ‘breakdown’ of the political synchronisation of Western policy 
towards Russia, and in general on the creation and expansion of tensions 
between Washington and its European allies.	This	will	be	based	on	a	search	
for	 ‘sectoral’	normalisations	 (‘resets’)	with	 individual	 states,	particularly	by	
enticing	 them	with	 prospects	 for	 economic	 cooperation.	This	 applies	 to	 EU	
member	states	as	well	as	Japan,	the	latter	of	which	Russia	will	seek	to	‘neutral-
ise’	by	feigning	an	openness	to	resolve	the	two	countries’	territorial	dispute,	
and	playing	on	Tokyo’s	concerns	at	the	assertiveness	of	Beijing’s	policy.
At	the	same	time,	Russia	will	try	to	intensify	its	political,	economic	and	mili-
tary	relations	with	its	non-Western	partners.	Above all, Russia will continue 
to strive,	despite	all	the	perceived	disadvantages, to deepen and strengthen 
its relationship with China.	Its	strategic	‘embrace’	of	Beijing	is	intended	to	
serve	as	a	form	of	security	in	the	event	of	open	conflict	with	the	United	States,	
and	provide	the	maximum	profit	to	Russia	from	the	expected	further	rise	in	
China’s	power.
Despite	 the	 failure	of	Russia’s	policy	 towards	Ukraine,	 the	Kremlin	will	not	
deviate	from	the	course	of	reintegrating	the	post-Soviet	area	under	 its	aegis	
and	blocking	the	integration	of	the	countries	within	that	area	with	Western	
structures.	Russia will continue to seek both to deepen the economic inte-
gration within the framework of the EAEU, and to include new members	
in	this organisation (e.g.	by	pressing	Azerbaijan	and/or	Tajikistan	to	join).	By	
exploiting	the	economic	dependence	of	the	EAEU’s	members	and	their	elites’	
fears	of	 internal	destabilisation,	Moscow	will	attempt	 to	 induce	 them	to	co-
ordinate	their	foreign	policies	and	to	deepen	military	integration	within	the	
framework	of	the	Collective	Security	Treaty	Organisation	(CSTO).	The	instru-
ments	 it	will	use	in	the	realm	of	propaganda	include	the	following:	compro-
mising	the	West	and	its	structures	(including	the	EU	and	NATO),	promoting	
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Russian	‘conservative	ideas’,	organising	and	supporting	pro-Russian	political	
movements,	and	promoting	a	policy	of	memory	whose	visions	are	compatible	
with	those	of	Russia	(in	particular	exploiting	the	memory	of	the	so-called	‘Great	
Patriotic	War’	of	1941–45).	In response to the West’s decreasing activity in 
the CIS area, the Russian strategy will probably prove effective (for ex-
ample, the ongoing subordination of Belarus and the countries of South-
ern Caucasus).	In	contrast,	Russia will not be able to counter the growing 
influence of China	in	Central	Asia.	
During	Putin’s	next	parliamentary	 term	we	 should	 expect	Russian control 
over Belarus to be strengthened.	Russia	already	effectively	controls	the	Be-
larusian	army,	and	probably	has	great	influence	in	the	security	services.	The	
countries’	infrastructure	links	and	economic	dependence	will	be	further	used	
to	gradually	force Minsk into making further political concessions (such	
as	the	introduction	of	a	common	visa	regime).
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IV. THE armEd ForcES 
1. The current state of affairs
The principles of the Russian Federation’s military policy,	particularly	in	
the	field	of	the	structural-organisational	changes	and	technical	modernisation	
of	the	Armed	Forces,	have been consistently implemented since the begin-
ning of Vladimir Putin’s rule	in	2000.	Russia’s	military	capability	has	con-
tinuously	expanded	in	favourable	financial	conditions	–	regardless	of	periodic	
economic	fluctuations	–	since	the	beginning	of	the	millennium.	
Figure 11. Budget expenditure on national defence (billions of roubles) 
0
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20082000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Overall state expenditure National defence*
[billions of roubles]
* These are the expenses listed in the section of the state budget entitled ‘Defence’, although they do not 
cover all Russia’s expenditure on the armed forces
Source: Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru 
During Putin’s third term, the growth in Russia’s military potential has 
become a policy priority, not only in terms of national security, but also in 
economic and social terms.	The	rearmament	programmes	being	implement-
ed	(the	so-called	State	Armament	Programme,	 in	Russian	Государственная 
Программа Вооружений, GPV)	 –	 starting	 from	 the	 GPV-2020	 programme	
passed	in	2011	(planned	to	run	from	2011	to	2020)	and	within	the	framework	
of	 the	GPV-2027	programme	launched	at	 the	beginning	of	2018	(planned	for	
2018–27)	–	are	seen	as	a	flywheel	for	the	country’s	economic	development	(by	
developing,	 or	 acquiring	 from	 outside	 and	 implementing,	 modern	 technol-
ogy	–	also	 in	 the	civil	 sector	–	and	creating	new,	highly	 skilled	engineering	
and	labour	personnel).	The	restrictions	on	the	growth	of	military	expenditure	
(which	have	been	apparent	since	2014)	are	mainly	declarative,	and	have	not	
slowed	the	process	of	modernising	the	RF’s	Armed	Forces	or	changed	the	direc-
tion	of	the	Russian	army’s	transformation.	
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The	‘milestones’	in	the	process	of	modernising	the	armed	forces	during	Putin’s	
third	term	were	the	war	in	Ukraine	(since	2014)	and	Syria	(in	which	Russia	
has	been	directly	involved	since	2015).	This	first	action	served	as	a	justification	
for	the	expansion	of	the	army’s	offensive	formations	(especially	in	the	Western	
strategic	direction),	and	the	second	for	the	acceleration	of	the	changeover	to	
new	generations	of	weapons	and	military	equipment.
In assessing the current state of Russia’s military capabilities as built up 
so far under Putin, the following transformations in the organisational 
sphere deserve special attention:
•	 the	 concentration of all issues related to the wider defence of the 
territory of the Russian Federation	(including	operations	in	the	areas	
of	countries	bordering	Russia	and	inhabited	by	Russian-speaking	popu-
lations)	 into the hands of the RF’s Armed Forces.	The	 other	military	
formations	have	been	operationally	subordinated	to	them,	in	the	first	in-
stance	the	National	Guard	(the	former	Internal	Troops	of	the	Interior	Min-
istry,	whose	powers	have	been	extended	to	include	the	implementation	of	
tasks	connected	with	military	occupation),	the	Border	Troops	of	the	FSB	
and	the	Troops	of	the	Ministry	of	Emergency	Situations (Министерство 
по Чрезвычайным Ситуациям,	МЧС).	Their	operational	sovereignty	is	
de facto	 limited	to	ensuring	order	and	internal	security	on	the	territory	
of	the	Russian	Federation.	In	the	event	of	armed	conflict	with	an	exter-
nal	enemy,	the	formations	of	the	above-mentioned	troops	will	be	directly	
subordinated	to	the	local	commands	of	the	RF	Armed	Forces	in	strategic	
directions;
•	 the	identification of five main strategic directions	(Western,	Southern,	
Central,	Eastern	and	Northern/Arctic),	and the creation of strategic com-
mands	linked to them, based	on	the	current	military	district	commands	
(with	the	exception	of	the	Northern	direction,	which	had	no	prior	basis	as	
a	military	district,	and	was	based	on	the	Northern	Fleet),	while	reducing	
the	number	and	changing	the	nature	of	the	latter	into	administrative	and	
logistical	structures;	
•	 entrusting	 the	 strategic	 directions’	 commands	with	 full	 operational	 au-
thority	over	the	units	subordinated	to	them	(at	the	expense	of	the	compe-
tence	of	the	above-mentioned	military	formations	which	are	subordinate	
to	other	departments,	and	also	the	commands	of	armed	forces	and	 inde-
pendent	troops	of	the	RF	Armed	Forces,	with	the	exception	of	the	nuclear	
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component	and	strategic	elements	of	air	and	space	defence),	and	as	a	con-
sequence,	creating effective groups of forces linking operational and 
strategic echelons;
•	 the designation as the two principal strategic directions of the West-
ern	(taking	into	consideration	the	subordination	of	the	forces	and	resourc-
es	subordinated	to	the	Northern	and	Southern	strategic	commands	to	ac-
tivities	in	this	direction) and the Eastern. This	gives	the	Central	strategic	
direction,	in	terms	of	the	forces	and	resources	in	the	Central	Military	Dis-
trict,	the	character	above	all	of	a	secondary	strategic	echelon	for	the	West-
ern	and	Eastern	strategic	directions;
•	 the emphasis placed (since	2015)	on building up offensive potential (the	
formation	of	new	all-military	tactical	formations	and	support	&	security	
units)	in	the	European	part	of	Russia,	directed	in	the	first	instance	towards	
activities	in	the	Western	strategic	direction;
•	 developing the ability to rapidly mobilise and move large forces of 
troops between strategic directions (theatres of war)	 primarily	 us-
ing	rail	and	aircraft,	as	well	as	the	ability	to	carry	out	a	massive	precision	
strike	with	missiles,	and	also	(in	the	tactical	dimension)	the	ability	to	con-
duct	uninterrupted	operations	at	night	and	in	difficult	weather	conditions	
(with	particular	regard	to	winter	conditions).
As a consequence of these actions, Russia’s military potential should be 
considered as optimal with regard to its declared operational needs.	The	
real	numbers	of	the	RF	Armed	Forces	in	peacetime	do	not	exceed	900,000	sol-
diers.	This	allows	us	 to	assume	that	 the	observed	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	
all-military	tactical	formations,	particularly	the	divisions	in	the	Western	stra-
tegic	 direction	 (see	 Appendix	 6),	will	 in	 the	 foreseeable	 future	 come	 under	
the	established	ceiling	of	1	million	soldiers.	Judging	by	the	training	activities	
which	have	been	organised	in	recent	years,	it	appears	that	only	a	small	number	
of	units	are	kept	on	a	wartime	footing	or	a	similar	level,	while	the	majority	re-
main	as	incomplete	structures	which,	if	necessary,	will	be	upgraded	to	a	war-
time	footing	on	the	basis	of	trained	reserves;	the	personnel	core	of	these	units	
will	consist	of	professional	and	contract	soldiers.
The	potential	core	is	made	up	of	the	1	million	(formally)	soldiers	of	the	RF	Armed	
Forces	(the	other	military	formations	number	500,000),	and	the	total	number	
of	trained	reserves	in	the	Russian	army	should	be	assessed	at	6	million.
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changes in the size of the rF Armed Forces (in thousands)
  January 2011 January 2018
Total full-time personnel (formal posts) 1000 1013.6
of which: professional and contract officers 320 225
of which: professional & contract NCOs and soldiers 230 405 *
of which: conscript NCOs and soldiers 300 240
of which: students in military colleges 40 55
* In the period from December 2017 to February 2018, divergent figures on the total number of contract 
soldiers in the RF Armed Forces were given, from 500,000 to 384,000; the second figure is identical to 
that given at the end of 2016. The full-time estimate for 2017 was 405,000.
Source: authors’ calculations
At	the	end	of	Putin’s	third	term,	the	Russian	army	also	had	a	relatively	strong	
tactical air force,	 consisting	 of	 32	 fighter	 squadrons	 (including	 4	 new	 Su-
30	 and	 Su-35	 multi-role	 aircraft),	 24	 bombing	 and	 assault	 squadrons	 (5	 of	
which	are	Su-34s),	8	tactical	reconnaissance	squadrons	and	12	helicopter	bases	
and	brigades.	Most	 of	 the	 equipment	 is	 either	new	or	 completely	upgraded.	
Over	the	last	decade	the	Russian	tactical	air	force	has	received	about	540	new	
or	upgraded	combat	aircraft,	as	well	as	430	new	helicopters	(including	more	
than	200	combat	Mi-28s	and	Ka-52s).	
There	 have	 also	 been	 changes	 to	 the	 nature	 and	 structure	 of	 the	 airborne 
troops;	currently	they	are de facto mechanised	formations	with	an	increased	
capacity	for	rapid	deployment,	offering	a	destructive	force	comparable	to	the	
classic	 mechanised	 tactical	 formations	 (especially	 after	 including	 the	 tank	
companies,	and	ultimately	the	tank	battalions,	 into	the	divisions	and	air	as-
sault	brigades	).	Initially	(from	2012)	reconnaissance	brigades	were	formed	ex-
clusively	in	the	Western	strategic	direction	(the	first	such	unit	in	the	Eastern	
military	district	was	initiated	in	2018),	combining	various	reconnaissance	ele-
ments	including	electronic	warfare	units.
It	must	 be	 recognised	 that	 the	most	 important	 elements	 of	 the	 RF’s	 Armed	
Forces	which	determine	its	capabilities	for	the	deterrence	and	defence	of	the	
state’s	most	 important	 regions	 and	 sites,	 and	which	 in	 the	 political	 dimen-
sion	establish	 the	relative	balance	of	Russia’s	military	potential	with	 that	of	
the	United	States,	 are	 its	strategic nuclear arms, as well as its system of 
air and space defence,	which	over	a	decade	have	been	modernised	to	include	
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new	generations	of	weaponry.	Unlike	conventional	operational	 forces,	 these	
components	were	 involved	 in	 the	structural	 changes	 to	only	a	 small	extent,	
and	their	potential	has	been	increased	by	the	delivery	of	new	weapons,	mainly	
the	Yars	land-based	MIRV-equipped	intercontinental	ballistic	missile	(out	of	
110	missiles,	these	currently	make	up	a	third	of	the	land-based	nuclear	arse-
nal;	during	the	previous	decade,	in	addition,	78	Topol-M	missiles	were	brought	
into	service.	In	total,	by	the	end	of	2017	the	RF’s	Strategic	Missile	Troops	had	
322	missiles	with	1174	nuclear	warheads	at	its	disposal),	the	Bulava	SLBM	(cur-
rently	deployed	on	4	nuclear	submarines,	including	3	of	the	new	Borei	type;	
4	additional	units	of	 the	 improved	Borei-M	version	are	under	construction);	
as	well	as	S-400	air	defence	missile	systems	(over	the	last	decade,	the	Russian	
army	received	a	total	of	368	S-400	launchers,	which	allowed	23	regiments	to	
be	rearmed).
The	Russian	defence industry	is	still	a	world	leader.	Reasons	for	this	include:
•	 Russia’s	 significant	 expenditure	 on	 the	 purchase	 of	 arms	 and	 military	
equipment	(about	$35	billion	in	2017);
•	 revenue	from	arms	exports	(close	to	$15	billion	in	2017);
•	 state	 investments	 in	the	development	and	upgrading	of	military	produc-
tion	facilities;
•	 tax	and	loan	discounts	which	aid	the	transformation	and	consolidation	of	
military	enterprises.
It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	Russia has ceased maintaining unprofitable enter-
prises	(including	giants	like	Izhmash,	which	was	notable	in	the	development	
of	the	Soviet	military	but	has	now	been	reduced	and	taken	over	by	the	nomi-
nally	private	Kalashnikov	group);	this	has	led	to	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	
production	plants,	and	the	extraction	of	the	leading	producers	of	specific	cat-
egories	of	weapons	or	components,	the	vast	majority	of	which	have	orders	from	
the	Russian	armed	forces	or	foreign	contractors	until	at	 least	the	year	2020.	
This has allowed for investment in a new generation of	technological lines	
(such	as	Sukhoi,	 the	main	 supplier	of	 combat	aircraft,	and	UralMashZavod,	
the	leading	provider	of	tanks)	or	for	new	factories	to	be	built	from	the	ground	
up	(such	as	Almaz-Antei,	 the	main	provider	of	air	defence	missile	systems).	
The	treatment of the technical modernisation of the RF Armed Forces as 
a great social programme	for	the	maintenance	and	development	of	the	main	
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branches	of	industry	is	of	some	significance	for	the	state	of	the	arms	industry,	
as	it	allows	a	high	level	of	support	for	the	government	to	be	maintained	among	
the	elite	of	the	Russian	working	class	(especially	after	the	unpopular	decisions	
to	close	some	of	the	plants	at	the	turn	of	the	2010s).
2. The main challenges
The main challenge in view of Putin’s next presidential term remains 
the continued technical modernisation of the RF Armed Forces.	 Al-
though	the	implementation	of	the	State	Armament	Programme	for	the	period	
2011–20	should	be	considered	as	safe	from	any	threat	(with	the	exception	of	
arms	for	the	Navy	and	the	new	generation	of	weapons,	of	which	more	later),	
and	in	many	cases	it	may	be	significantly	exceeded	(for	example,	in	terms	of	
the	plans	to	rearm	the	missile	brigades	with	Iskander	systems),	the	implemen-
tation	of	 the	new	programme	(GPV-2027)	has	encountered	serious	problems	
right	from	the	outset.	We	should	assume	that	the	two-year	delay	in	its	adop-
tion	(originally	the	programme	was	supposed	to	come	into	effect	from	2016)	
has been caused not by a lack of financial resources, but	by problems of 
a technical nature. These	have	been	caused,	on	the	one	hand,	by the	breaking	
of	the	ties	of	cooperation	with	Ukraine,	and	on	the	other	with	the	increasingly	
tough	 restrictions	on	acquiring	 technology	 from	 the	West.	Although	during	
the	three	years	(starting	in	2015)	of	the	policy	of	import	substitution	the	Rus-
sian arms industry has achieved self-sufficiency in terms of the compo-
nents and subassemblies it used to import from Ukraine	(this	principally	
concerned	engines	 for	helicopters	and	power	plants	 for	 large	cruiser	 ships),	
restoring military-technical	cooperation with the highly developed NATO	
states should be considered very unlikely	in	the	foreseeable	future.
On	the	other	hand,	there	are	challenges	associated	with	breaking the techno-
logical barriers in designing next-generation weapons	(the	failed	Iskander	
and	Bulava	missile	 tests	 served	as	examples	of	 such	problems	even	a	decade	
ago).	Breaking	the	technological	barriers	is	not	only	a	problem	for	Russia,	but	
also	for	each	state	which	is	trying	to	develop	new	generations	of	weapons	(con-
sider	the	US’s	problems	with	the	missiles	supplied	for	its	global	missile	defence	
system).	In	the	case	of	Russia,	this	principally	applies	to	the	new	categories	and	
generations	of	strategic	weapons.	It	is	worth	considering	in	greater	detail	the	
Avangard	and	Kinjal	hypersonic	shells	(with	top	speeds	many	times	in	excess	
of	the	speed	of	sound),	which	are	planned	for	introduction	within	the	frame-
work	 of	 the	 GPV-2027	 programme;	 the	 air-launched	missile	with	 a	 nuclear-
powered	motor;	 underwater	 drone-missiles;	military	 lasers;	 and	 the	 Sarmat	
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heavy	 intercontinental	 ballistic	missiles.	 Apart	 from	 the	 last	 one,	 these	 are	
completely	new	categories	of	weapons	(even	though	attempts	to	develop	mili-
tary	application	for	lasers	were	made	during	the	Cold	War),	and	as	such,	they	
have	 been	 subject	 to	 various	 technological	 errors	 during	 their	 trials,	which	
may	delay	their	deployment	in	actual	service.	Concerning	conventional	weap-
ons,	the	main	examples	of	problems	with	overcoming	technological	barriers	in	
recent	years	have	concerned	the	construction	of	a	fully	efficient	hybrid	engine	
for	 conventional	 submarines	 (the	 prototype	 Lada	 ship	 has	 been	 in	 so-called	
‘experimental	operation’	 since	2010;	 the	construction	of	 two	additional	units	
had	been	put	on	hold);	and	the	final	version	of	the	engine	(the	so-called	second	
stage)	of	the	5th-generation	Su-57	combat	aircraft	(tests	with	the	prototype	of	
this	engine	started	in	autumn	2017,	nearly	eight	years	after	the	test	flight	of	the	
prototype	aircraft).	On	the	other	hand,	one	example	of	an	effective,	timely	im-
plementation	of	new	technologies	is	the	new	S-500	air	defence	missile	systems,	
the	production	of	which	started	in	2018.	A	separate	concern	is	how	to	get	the	
new	generation	of	weapons	to	the	stage	of	making	it	economically	viable	to	pur-
chase	them,	as	happened	in	the	case	of	the	T-14	tank	on	the	Armata	platform.
The partial asymmetry of Russia’s military capability, in comparison 
with the US, remains its greatest challenge.	In	the	development	of	military	
technologies,	Russia	has	made	up	for	most	of	its	lag	behind	the	leading	coun-
tries	of	Western	Europe	and	 Japan;	and	 in	 the	case	of	multiple	 categories	of	
weapons	(missiles,	air	defence	systems	and	electronic	warfare,	nuclear	sub-
marines,	the	new	generation	of	tanks	and	combat	aircraft)	it	is	quite	definitely	
running	ahead	of	 them.	However,	Russia	still	 lags	behind	the	United	States,	
both	in	terms	of	the	scope	of	the	work	it	is	conducting	and	the	amount	it	spends,	
as	well	as	in	introducing	its	new	equipment	into	the	arsenal	of	its	armed	forces.	
The	relative	balance	between	the	Russian	and	American	defence	industries	ex-
ists	solely	in	the	area	of	strategic	arms,	especially	nuclear	weapons	and	deliv-
ery	vehicles	 (land-based	and	sea-launched	 intercontinental	ballistic	missile,	
nuclear	submarines	–	carriers	of	nuclear	weapons);	 in	terms	of	the	airborne	
component	of	the	nuclear	triad	(strategic	bombers)	and	strategic	missile	de-
fence,	the	Americans	still	have	the	advantage.	The	relative	advantage	for	Rus-
sia	lies	in	the	development	of	radio-electronic	systems	and	air	defence	&	anti-
missile	systems	at	the	tactical	and	operational	level,	as	well	as	in	armour	(in	
2017	Russia	started	full	production	of	the	world’s	first	next-generation	tank,	
the	T-14	on	the	Armata	platform).
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3. Prospects
Due to the long-term nature of the modernisation processes,	which	con-
cern	more	than	just	the	RF	Armed	Forces	(as	this	is	a	phenomenon	common	to	
all	high-technology	armies),	any change to the army’s current status should 
be considered very unlikely	 in	the	perspective	of	Putin’s	next	presidential	
term.	The	trends	of	the	transformations	in	the	Russian	army	as	set	in	the	first	
decade	of	the	21st	century	are	firmly	set,	and	are	solely	dependent	on	Russia’s	
economic	and	social	ability	to	implement	them.	The	programme	of	organisa-
tion	 and	modernisation	 as	 observed	 and	designated	 for	 implementation	has	
the	sole	purpose	of	maintaining	the	Russian	Armed	Forces’	offensive	capabili-
ties	while	securing	the	state	it	has	already	achieved.	We	should	assume	that	
any fundamental change in the observed military policy of the Russian 
Federation (and	hence	 the	direction	and	pace	of	 the	armed	 forces’	develop-
ment)	could only be brought about by a long-term economic collapse last-
ing many years.
In	view	of	Putin’s	fourth	presidential	term,	we	should	expect	to	see	the	first	
tactical	 formations	 being	 completely	 rearmed	with	 new	 types	 of	 arms	 and	
military	 equipment	within	 the	 framework	 of	 GPV-2027.	This	 programme	 is	
expected	to	include	the	rearmament	of	the	first	aviation	squadrons	with	the	
next	generation	of	Su-57	combat	aircraft,	T-14	tanks	for	troop	battalions,	and	
S-500	systems	for	the	air	and	space	defence	squadrons.
In the light of Putin’s next presidential term, the planned organisation-
al increases in the RF Armed Forces’ offensive capabilities should not 
encounter any serious problems.	The	process	 of	updating	armaments	 and	
military	equipment	with	new-generation	technology	will	depend	not	only	on	
technological	issues,	but	also	on	the	development	of	the	economic	situation	in	
Russia.	Even	though	the	rearmament	spending	can	most	likely	be	maintained	
until	2020	(as	part	of	GVP-2020)	thanks	to	the	significant	fall	in	the	value	of	
the	 rouble	 against	 the	major	 currencies	 in	 the	middle	 of	 this	 decade	 (while	
Russia	has	largely	been	forced	by	the	sanctions	to	give	up	any	acquisition	of	
new	 technologies	 and	 components	 from	 the	West),	 Russia’s	 continued	nega-
tive	trends	of	economic	development	will	force	it	to	increase	the	militarisation	
of	the	budget	(since	2015	a	tendency	to	conceal	real	military	spending	in	the	
budget	statement	has	been	observed,	accompanied	by	changes	in	the	legisla-
tion	concealing	the	amounts	being	spent	on	armaments),	or	to	limit	its	military	
commissions,	although	this	latter	is	far	less	likely.	It	must	be	assumed	that	the	
essence	of	GVP-2027	will	be	to	continue	the	rearmament	process	on	the	basis	of	
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already	existing	technologies	and	designs,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	mass	pro-
duction	of	the	weapons	currently	being	tested	and	of	new-generation	military	
equipment,	although	it	remains	an	open	question	as	to	how	much	will	be	spent	
on	brand	new	types	of	weapons,	as	well	as	the	most	capital-intensive	types	of	
weapons	already	existing	(such	as	new	aircraft	carriers).
It must be assumed that during the next decade in Russia work will con-
tinue on maximising the capabilities of existing categories of weapons,	
especially	in	terms	of	their	unification	(basing	many	types	of	arms	and	mili-
tary	equipment	on	common	components)	and	automation	(decoupling	from	the	
human	factor)	in	accordance	with	general	global	trends.	One	new	development	
which	should	be	expected	is	the	robotisation	of	the	Russian	armed	forces.	Al-
though	Russia	had	 already	mastered	 the	 technology	 and	begun	 introducing	
different	categories	of	unmanned	aerial	vehicles	into	service	in	the	middle	of	
this	decade	(especially	in	field	reconnaissance	aircraft	and	engineering	works),	
during	the	next	decade	we	should	expect	the	 introduction	of	combat	robots,	
firstly	drones	for	land	operations,	and	then	combat	unmanned	aerial	vehicles	
(UAV)	and	underwater	drone-missiles.	The	implementation	of	these	technolo-
gies	will	depend	on	breaking	not	technological	barriers	but	rather	mental	bar-
riers,	and	hence,	on	assigning	financial	resources	for	regular	production.
The nature and shape of the RF Armed Forces as achieved during the 
structural transformations at the turn of the 2010s must be regarded as 
fundamental	 and	 unalterable	 –	 not	 just	 during	 Putin’s	 fourth	 presidential	
term,	but	likely	also	throughout	the	next	decade.	The	programme	of	organisa-
tion	and	modernisation	as	observed	and	designated	for	implementation	has	the	
sole	purpose	of	maintaining	the	Russian	Armed	Forces’	offensive	capabilities	
while	securing	the	state	it	has	already	achieved.	The general objective of the 
development of the Russian armed forces remains: to prepare for a pos-
sible military confrontation with the United States and its NATO allies.	
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aPPEndIx 1. ThE MOST IMPORTANT REPRESSIvE LEGISLATIvE 
ChANGES IN RUSSIA IN ThE yEARS 2012–17
During	Vladimir	Putin’s	third	presidential	term,	a	number	of	laws	were	adopt-
ed	 which	 were	 aimed	 at	 supplementing	 and	 ‘sealing’	 the	 existing	 achieve-
ments	in	the	field	of	state	control	over	society.	These	included	strengthening	
the	control	of	 the	state	organs	over	the	activity	of	natural	and	legal	persons	
(principally	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 the	media),	 as	well	 as	 ex-
panding	the	arsenal	of	 instruments	available	 to	repress	any	criticism	of	 the	
authorities.	Though	these	have	not	been	applied	on	a	mass	scale,	and	some	of	
them	are	very	difficult	to	enforce	consistently,	at	least	they	are	a	comfortable	
deterrent,	which	can	have	a	preventive	‘chilling	effect’	discouraging	citizens	
from	 becoming	 too	 active	 in	 certain	 areas.	 Special	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	
to	tightening	control	over	the	internet,	in	the	light	of	its	growing	usefulness	
for	the	grassroots	mobilisation	of	protest	potential	(thanks	to	messenger	pro-
grams	and	social	networks).
1. laws targeted at non-governmental organisations independent 
of the authorities
•	 on ‘foreign agents’	from	July	2012.	This	obliged	Russian	non-profit	organi-
sations	which	received	funding	from	abroad	and	at	the	same	time	engaged	
in	‘political	activities’	to	adopt	the	status	of	‘foreign	agent’.	Leaving	aside	the	
disparaging	epithet	of	‘agent’,	the	definition	of	political	activity	was	defined	
very	broadly	and	inaccurately.	In	practice,	the	status	of	‘agent’	has	the	effect	
of	burdening	these	organisations	with	time-consuming	and	costly	account-
ing,	supervisory	and	reporting	procedures,	and	also	reduces	their	opportu-
nities	for	cooperation	with	the	authorities	and	business	environments;
•	 on ‘undesirable organisations’	 from	May	2015,	 concerning	 foreign	and	
international	 NGOs	 operating	 in	 Russia.	 It	 enables	 the	 classification	 of	
their	activity	as	‘unwanted’	if	it	constitutes	a	threat	to	the	foundations	of	
the	constitutional	regime	or	the	defence	and	security	of	the	state.	All	ac-
tivities	by	such	‘undesirable’	entities	in	Russia	(including	those	which	are	
purely informational)	are	prohibited,	and	persons	involved	in	their	activi-
ties	can	be	subject	to	administrative	sanctions	or	criminal	prosecution.
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2. laws restricting access to information, targeted at independent 
media, including the Internet. 
•	 	from	October	2014,	on	limiting	(as	of	2017)	the	permissible	share	of	foreign 
capital in the Russian media	to	20%.	This	act	was	aimed	at	eliminating	or	
taking	political	control	over	popular	media	which	are	critical	of	Kremlin	
policy;
•	 an	amendment	to	the	media	law	in	November	2017,	including	foreign me-
dia	(very	broadly	defined)	operating	on	the	territory	of	Russia	in	the cate-
gory	of entities	covered	by	the	law on ‘foreign agents’	from	2012.	The	same	
law	introduced	the	ability	to	block	websites	of	‘undesirable	organisations’	
without	a	court	order;
•	 from	July	2017,	prohibiting Internet	users	in	Russia	from	using	anonymi-
sation services,	VPNs,	proxy	 servers	 and	 the	TOR	network,	 i.e.	 tools	 to	
circumvent	content	blocks	or	hide	the	user’s	identity,	and	also	allowing	the	
government’s	media	control	agency	Roskomnadzor	to	block	access	to	infor-
mation	on	and	use	of	anonymity	services.
3. laws restricting freedom of speech
•	 	from	July	2012,	giving	Roskomnadzor	the right, without the sanction of 
the court, to block web pages	which	show	harmful	content	(such	as	child	
pornography,	or	the	promotion	of	drugs	or	suicide).	A	‘black	list’	of	banned	
sites	was	also	created.	Cases	of	provocation	(e.g.	placing	harmful	content	
in	the	user	comments)	provide	an	excuse	to	close	websites	which	are	in-
convenient	 for	 the	authorities.	The	context	 in	which	 the	content	appears	
is	also	often	not	taken	into	account.	In	February	2014	a	law	came	into	force	
giving	Roskomnadzor	the	right	–	at	the	request	of	the	Prosecutor,	without	
the	sanction	of	the	Court	–	to	add	to	the	‘black	list’	and	block	any	websites	
that	contain	‘calls	to	extremist	activity	and	popular	disturbances’	(in	prac-
tice	these	definitions	are	very	broad,	and	allow	content	to	be	blocked	solely	
because	of	their	criticism	of	the	authorities);
•	 	from	 June	 2013,	 the prohibition of the promotion of homosexuality	
among	minors,	 and	 strengthening	 penalties	 for	 insulting	 religious	 feel-
ings.	This	is	part	of	the	current	stigmatisation	by	the	state	propaganda	of	
manifestations	 of	 ‘Western’	 decadence	 and	 corruption,	 and	 its	 counter-
promotion	of	‘traditional’	Russian	values;
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•	 	from	May	2014,	making it more	difficult to publish content on the In-
ternet,	 by	 means	 including	 imposing	 restrictions	 on	 popular	 bloggers	
which	are	more	typical	of	the	press	(ordering	bloggers	who	are	followed	by	
more	than	three	thousand	people	per	day	to	register	and	disclose	personal	
data,	and	imposing	liability	on	them	for	the	dissemination	of	misleading	
and	extremist	information).
The	following	laws	also	restrict	the	freedom	of	expression	indirectly:
•	 from	December	2014	on the ‘localisation of personal data’,	imposing	a	le-
gal	obligation	to	keep	the	personal	data	of	RF	citizens	on	the	territory	of	
Russia	alone.	This	makes	it	easier	for	the	special	services	to	access	personal	
data,	 and	severely	 limits	opportunities	 to	use	 foreign	servers	 to	 conduct	
any	activity	independent	of	the	authorities;	
•	 	the	so-called	Yarovaya Act	(from	the	name	of	one	of	its	authors,	Duma	dep-
uty	Irina	Yarovaya)	of	July	2016,	which	updated	the	provisions	on	the	fight	
against	terrorism.	Of	all	its	provisions,	the	most	controversy	was	sparked	
by	 an	 order	 to	 operators	&	 owners	 of	 Internet	 resources	 and	messenger	
apps	to	save	all	text	and	audiovisual	content	sent	via	the	Internet,	as	well	
as	recordings	of	conversations,	calls	and	text	messages,	for	a	period	of	six	
months	(this	part	of	the	act	will	come	into	force	in	July	2018),	and	to	share	
this	information	with	the	special	services	without	the	need	for	a	court	or-
der.	Another	controversial	issue	is	the	obligation	to	share	‘encryption	keys’	
to	messenger	apps	at	the	request	of	the	FSB;
•	 from	July	2017,	abolishing the anonymity of Instant Messaging (IM) us-
ers;	as	of	 January	2018,	use	of	a	messenger	app	 is	possible	only	after	 the	
user	enters	a	subscription	number.
4. laws restricting freedom of assembly
•	 an	amendment	to	the	act	on	public	assemblies	and	the	code	of	administra-
tive	offences	from	June	2012,	introducing	high fines for organisers of il-
legal	protests, as	well	as	legal	protests	which	lead	to	damage	to	property	
or	health,	as	well	as	a	ban	on	organising	protests	by	people	who	have	twice	
received	 administrative	 punishment.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 organising	 provoca-
tions,	this	law	facilitates	the	repression	of	the	organisers	of	the	protests,	or	
restricts	the	protests	themselves;
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•	 from	 July	 2017,	 abolishing the possibility of organising spontaneous 
assemblies	(without	prior	notification	to	the	authorities	of	the	executive	
branch)	in	the	form	of	meetings	of	parliamentary	deputies	of	various	levels	
with	the	electorate	(previously,	this	form	allowed	the	circumvention	of	the	
restrictive	law	on	meetings	used	by	the	authorities	to	hinder	the	organisa-
tion	of	demonstrations).
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aPPEndIx 2. RUSSIA’S INTERNAL SECURITy INSTITUTIONS 
Russia’s	 legislation	 contains	 imprecise	 concepts	 such	 as	 ‘national	 security	
forces’	or	‘federal	bodies	of	executive	authorities	competent	in	the	field	of	se-
curity,	and	political	scientists	and	press	commentators	use	the	general	term	
‘ministries	of	force’	(силовики).	The	lack	of	a	precise	definition	of	the	concept	
of	 ‘special	 service’	makes	 it	difficult	 to	develop	a	 clear	 classification	of	 such	
institutions.
Although	the	decision-making	powers	have	since	2000	been	consistently	con-
centrated	in	the	hands	of	politicians	from	the	special	services,	the	ministries	
themselves	are	instruments	of	Kremlin	policy,	and	not	independent	players	in	
internal	and	foreign	policy.
Russia's Domestic Security System
Federal
Security
Service
[FSB]
Courier
Service
Investigative
Committee
General
Prosecutor’s
Office
Penal
Service
National
Guard
Federal
Defence
Service
[FSO]
Main
Intelligence
Directorate
[GRU]
Foreign
Intelligence
Service
[SVR]
Interior
Ministry
GUSP*
Ministry
for Emergency
SituationsCustomsService
Financial
Monitoring
Service
Tax
ServiceMinistry
of Justice
Russia's
Domestic
Security
System
GUSP	–	the	President	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	Main	Directorate	of	Special	Programmes	(Russian	
Главное	управление	специальных	программ	Президента	Российской	Федерации);	this	institu-
tion	is	responsible	for	preparing	mobilisation	and	crisis	management	during	wartime	and	emergency	
situations
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The estimated size of specific internal security bodies
name of body Size
Federal Security Service 
(including the Federal Border Service)
at least 350,000
Interior Ministry 894,871
Federal Service of the National Guard Troops 340,000
Federal Protection Service between 10,000 and 25,000
Foreign Intelligence Service over 13,000
GRU (military intelligence) about 12,000
Source: authors’ calculations 
Putin’s	successive	terms	of	office	have	seen	the	construction	of	a	model	of	the	
security	 sector	 based	 on	 a	 system	 of	management	which	 is	 centralised	 and	
hierarchised	by	the	presidential	centre	of	power.	These	changes	have	also	in-
cluded	an	 improvement	 in	 the	special	 services’	 informational	 functions	and	
operating	techniques,	their	methods	of	intelligence	and	counterintelligence	in	
the	economic	and	industrial	fields,	etc.,	as	well	as	their	coordination	mecha-
nisms,	including	in	particular:
•	 improving	the	methods	of	acquiring	information,	improving	communica-
tions	systems	and	monitoring	electronic	communications	using	informa-
tion	technology,	active	interference	in	virtual	spaces	considered	as	fields	of	
conflict	with	the	enemy;
•	 strengthening	 the	 analytical-informational	 divisions	 and	 disseminating	
techniques	and	methodologies	for	situational	analysis,	etc.;
•	 improving	the	interaction	between	law	enforcement	bodies	and	the	special	
services,	 and	 their	 coordinated	 participation	 in	 strategic	 directions	 (the	
fight	 against	 terrorism,	 organised	 crime,	 political	 extremism,	 counter-
intelligence	protection),	as	well	as	 in	the	Kremlin’s	priority	projects	con-
nected	with	military	operations	outside	the	country.	
At	the	organisational	and	structural	level,	the	reforms	have	clearly	been	based	
on	old	concepts,	drawing	upon	the	model	of	the	KGB.	As	a	result,	the	sector	has	
conserved	many	features	of	the	old	system,	such	as:
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•	 he	organisation	of	the	service	along	military	lines,
•	 its	politicisation	(acting	at	the	Kremlin’s	inspiration	and	participating	in	its	
political	projects),
•	 its	availability	to	the	decision	makers	as	a	body	acting	above	the	law,
•	 the	lack	of	external	supervision	(presidential	control	guarantees	the	sec-
tor	an	‘umbrella’	of	impunity;	statistics	concerning	crimes	committed	by	
security	officers	are	a	protected	state	secret),
•	 the	 five-year	 planning	 period,	 which	 results	 in	 periodic	 –	 for	 reporting	
purposes	–	intensification	of	repressive	actions,	designed	to	justify	the	the-
sis	that	threats	to	the	security	of	the	state	are	rising,	and	thus	the	need	to	
maintain	the	high	budget	investments	in	the	ministries	of	force,
•	 budget	and	off-budget	ways	of	raising	funds	(the	‘commercialisation’	of	the	
special	services,	who	earn	income	from	economic	activity	conducted	by	en-
tities	they	themselves	have	created).
2016	saw	the	first	major	reorganisation	of	the	institutions	of	force	since	2003.	
The	Federal	Service	of	the	National	Guard	Troops	was	created	on	the	basis	of	
the	Interior	Troops,	which	had	hitherto	been	part	of	the	Interior	Ministry;	the	
Federal	Narcotics	Control	Service	was	dissolved,	as	was	the	Federal	Migration	
Service,	the	latter	being	downgraded	to	the	level	a	department	in	the	Interior	
Ministry.	The	creation	of	the	National	Guard	has	significantly	weakened	the	
potential	of	the	Interior	Ministry	through	its	takeover	of	special	police	units,	
and	by	licensing	and	supervising	security	companies	across	the	country.	These	
organisational	 changes	have	altered	 the	balance	between	 the	 institutions	of	
security	which	the	Kremlin	had	maintained	for	more	than	a	decade.
The	current	system	of	state	security	institutions	has	been	reduced	to	a	triad	of	
the	strongest	entities,	namely	the	FSB,	the	FSO	and	the	National	Guard.	In	this	
triad,	the	Federal	Security	Service	still	holds	the	dominant	position	because	of	
its	range	of	competences	(including	counterintelligence	supervision	of	the	oth-
er	structures	of	force,	including	the	RF	Armed	Forces).	This	has	been	accompa-
nied	by	an	increase	in	the	activity	of	the	FSB	(with	the	Kremlin’s	acceptance),	
which	has	recently	undertaken	a	number	of	operations	against	officers	of	the	
Interior	Ministry,	the	Investigative	Committee,	the	Federal	Customs	Service,	
as	well	as	representatives	of	the	central	and	local	administrations	as	part	of	
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the	 so-called	fight	 against	 corruption.	These	 activities	 demonstrate	 that	 the	
FSB	is	beginning	to	play	a	central	supervisory	role	in	the	security	of	the	state,	
and	is	seeking	to	bolster	its	structures.	The	National	Guard,	which	is	a	continu-
ation	of	the	tradition	of	the	Interior	Ministry’s	Internal	Troops	and	special	po-
lice	units,	is	intended	to	prevent	possible	public	protests	and	defend	key	state	
institutions.	The	Federal	Protection	Service	remains	directly	responsible	 for	
the	security	of	the	ruling	elite,	and	for	the	delivery	–	via	its	network	of	regional	
situation	centres,	through	secret	communications	channels	–	of	current	infor-
mation	on	the	situation	in	the	country.
The main institutions of the Russian Federation’s internal security system
The	Federal Security Service	(FSB).	This	is	the	service	with	the	broadest	area	of	
responsibilities,	covering	the	overall	control	of	the	political,	economic	and	social	
system	of	the	Russian	Federation.	It	operates	on	the	basis	of	the	law	on	the	Fed-
eral	Security	Service.	The	organisational	structure	of	the	service	corresponds	to	
the	wide	range	of	its	tasks.	By	order	of	the	law	on	the	Federal	Security	Service	
and	its	structures,	approved	by	Presidential	Decree	No.	960	of	11	August	2003,	
the	 FSB	has	become	a	 federal	 body	of	 executive	power,	which,	 in	 accordance	
with	its	competences,	carries	out	the	state’s	direction	of	the	security	of	the	Rus-
sian	Federation,	as	well	as	‘the	defence	and	protection	of	the	state	border	of	the	
Russian	Federation,	its	territorial	waters,	internal	waters,	the	exclusive	mari-
time	zones	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	economic	interests,	the	continental	shelf	
and	the	natural	resources	therein’;	the	protection	of	information	security;	it	also	
coordinates	the	counter-intelligence	protection	of	all	authorised	federal	bodies	
of	executive	power.	Since	2008	the	FSB	has	been	led	by	Aleksandr	Bortnikov.
The Foreign Intelligence Service	(SVR).	The	federal	body	of	executive	power.	
It	operates	on	the	basis	of	the	law	on	foreign	intelligence	(No.	5–FZ)	of	10	Janu-
ary	1996.	It	was	created	in	December	1991	on	the	basis	of	the	Central	 Intelli-
gence	Service	of	the	Soviet	Union,	which	a	few	months	earlier	had	been	split	
off	from	the	Committee	of	State	Security	(KGB)	of	the	Soviet	Union.	It	conducts	
legal	and	illegal	political,	economic	and	technical	espionage.	In	the	intelligence	
doctrine	created	by	Yevgeny	Primakov,	the	emphasis	was	laid	on	the	economic	
use	of	intelligence	operations.	In	organisational	terms	it	is	divided	into	opera-
tional	and	analytical	departments	and	a	support	division.	It	mainly	operates	
abroad,	but	also	conducts	espionage	on	the	territory	of	Russia.	The	protection	
by	force	of	its	operations	is	conducted	by	the	SVR’s	‘Zaslon’	(‘Cover’)	spetsnaz	
(special	forces)	unit	(the	first	information	on	this	topic	appeared	in	1998).	Since	
October	2016	the	head	of	the	SVR	has	been	Sergei	Naryshkin.
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The	Main (Intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).	The	foreign	
military	intelligence	service.	In	organisational	terms,	it	is	subordinate	to	the	
head	of	 the	General	Staff	and	 takes	 its	orders	 from	the	Chief	of	 the	General	
Staff	and	the	defence	minister.	It	conducts	legal	and	illegal	political,	scientific	
and	 technical	 espionage.	 Its	 tasks	 include	obtaining	 information	relevant	 to	
the	defence	capabilities	and	security	of	the	Russian	Federation,	obtaining	ra-
dio-electronic	and	space-based	intelligence,	analysing	the	international	trade	
in	explosives,	weapons	and	ammunition,	including	nuclear	weapons	and	their	
means	of	delivery.	As	a	result	of	the	reforms	carried	out	in	2010–11,	the	former	
spetsnaz	(special	forces	units)	of	the	GRU	were	subordinated	to	particular	mili-
tary	districts,	fleets	and	airborne	forces.	Since	January	2016	its	head	has	been	
Colonel-General	Igor	Korobov.	
The	Federal Protection Service	(FSO).	The	federal	body	of	executive	authority	
for	the	protection	of	the	authorities,	state	buildings	and	compounds.	It	oper-
ates	on	the	basis	of	the	law	on	the	defence	of	the	state.	It	implements	the	func-
tions	of	creating	state	policies,	including	normative	regulations,	in	the	area	of	
the	protection	of	state	compounds	and	physical	protection	of	state	officials,	as	
well	as	presidential,	governmental	and	other	types	of	special	communications	
&	information	distributed	to	the	federal	and	regional	government	bodies.	The	
regional	special	communications	centres	are	subordinate	to	the	autonomous	
Special	Communications	Service	of	the	Federal	Protection	Service.	The	service	
also	participates	 in	the	 implementation	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	 informa-
tion	security	policy.
The	President’s	Security	Service	(SBP)	 is	also	part	of	 the	FSO	and	has	 its	own	
special	status.	Since	May	2016	the	director	of	the	FSO	has	been	Dmitry	Kochnev.
The	Federal Service of the National Guard Troops (FSGN) is a federal body of 
executive power, created on 5 April 2016.	The	creation	of	the	FSGN	–	which,	in	
addition	to	the	internal	troops	of	the	Interior	Ministry,	absorbed	all	other	special	
units	(including	the	police’s	rapid	reaction	troops),	and	which	hitherto	had	been	
subordinate	to	the	interior	minister	–	meant	the	formation	of	a	strong,	milita-
rised	group	of	internal	forces	which	is	now	subordinate	only	to	the	head	of	state,	
and	which	can	conduct	independent	actions	on	the	territory	of	Russia	without	
the	need	 to	 coordinate	with	other	 services.	The	 competences	 of	 the	FSGN	 in-
clude:	the	protection	of	public	security,	participating	in	tasks	related	to	national	
defence;	monitoring	 the	 trade	 in	weapons;	 supervising	 the	activity	of	private	
protection	companies;	and	providing	paid	protection	services	for	selected	bodies	
of	the	national	administration	(including	regional	governors).
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An	important	change	that	has	occurred	in	the	security	sector	is	its	new	com-
mitment	to	the	implementation	of	the	tasks	associated	with	increasing	Russia’s	
military	capabilities.	Since	the	beginning	of	2013	the	RF	Armed	Forces,	which	
has	continuously	been	carrying	out	training	covering	all	areas	of	the	country	
by	turn,	have	been	in	a	state	of	permanent	combat	readiness.	The	activity	of	the	
armed	forces	has	been	accompanied	by	the	involvement	of	the	institutions	of	
force,	supporting	the	operation	of	various	types	of	troops	(the	National	Guard,	
the	Ministry	of	Emergency	Situations).	There	has	also	been	an	increase	in	the	
range	of	exercises	related	to	the	mobilisation	of	the	civil	administration	and	
the	verification	of	its	ability	to	operate	during	wartime	or	a	state	of	emergen-
cy.	This	is	reflected	in	the	new	edition	of	the	Military	Doctrine	of	the	Russian	
Federation	published	on	29	December	2014:	it	announced	the	development	of	
“new,	 non-traditional	methods	 linking	military	 and	 non-military	measures	
in	a	four-dimensional	combat	space”.	The	emphasis	on	non-military	measures	
demonstrates	 the	 government’s	 sanction	of	 the	doctrinal	 position	 of	 the	 so-
called	special	non-military	services	and	other	ministries	of	 force	as	entities	
which	operate	within	the	logic	of	complex	military	operations	and	often	play	
a	key	role	in	those	operations.	The	text	of	the	doctrine	also	introduced	policy	
adjustments	to	deal	with	potential	domestic	threats,	the	elimination	of	which	
is	directly	related	to	the	implementation	of	the	tasks	of	the	relevant	govern-
ment	departments.	The	list	of	domestic	threats	now	includes:	activities	aimed	
at	the	overthrow	by	force	of	the	constitutional	regime	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion;	 the	destabilisation	of	 the	domestic	 and	 social	 situation	 in	 the	 country;	
disorganising	the	operation	of	the	organs	of	state	power,	important	state	and	
military	sites	and	informational	infrastructure;	the	activities	of	terrorist	or-
ganisations	and	individuals	aimed	at	violating	the	sovereignty	and	territorial	
integrity	of	the	Russian	Federation.
Since	the	beginning	of	the	group’s	formation	its	head	has	been	General	Viktor	
Zolotov	(the	former	head	of	the	President’s	Security	Service).
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aPPEndIx 3. ThE RISE IN OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION IN RUSSIA, 
2000–17 
Figure. The rise in gas production in Russia, 2000–17
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Figure. The rise in oil production in Russia, 2000–17
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Source: Interfax, based on CDU TEK; www.cdu.ru 
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aPPEndIx 4. INCOME AND ExPENDITURE OF ThE RF’S BUDGET 
DIvIDED INTO SECTIONS
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* These are the only expenditures recorded in the section of the budget named ‘National defence’, howe-
ver, they do not cover all Russia’s expenditure on its armed forces
Source: the Russian Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.ru 
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aPPEndIx 5. ThE LARGEST INFRASTRUCTURE INvESTMENTS 
IN ThE OIL AND GAS SECTOR, 2000–17
Projects implemented
Name of project Activation date Capacity/
production capacity
cost of imple-
mentation
level of use in 2017 
Blue Stream gas 
pipeline
30 December 2002 16 bcm $3.2 billion 14.5 bcm 
Sakhalin-
Khabarovsk-
vladivostok gas 
pipeline
September 2011 30 bcm $15.6 billion 6 bcm 
Nord Stream gas 
pipeline
1st branch 8 Novem-
ber 2011; 2nd branch 
8 October 2012 
55 bcm
(2 branches, 27.5 bcm 
each)
€7.4 billion 51 bcm
Sakhalin-2 gas 
liquefaction plant
18 February 2009 9.6 million tons $20 billion 9.6 million tonnes
yamal-LNG gas 
liquefaction plant
8 December 2017 5.5 million tons (target 
from 2019 16.5 million 
tonnes)
$27 billion 1 million tonnes 
in the period from 
8 December 2017 to 
1 March 2018
ESPO (I and II) oil 
pipeline
ESPO I, Taishet-
Skovorodino 
section in 
December 2009; 
Skovorodino-
Daqing on 1 January 
2010; 
ESPO II,
Skovorodino-
Kozmino on 
25 December 2012 
ESPO I,
Taishet-Skovorodino 
section 30 million 
tonnes 
(expanded in 2014 to 
58 million tons, and 
in December 2017 to 
70 million tons),
Skovorodino-Daqing 
section 15 million 
tonnes (expanded 
in 2017 to 30 million 
tonnes)
ESPO II- 30 million 
tons
$23.2 billion 1st section, 
50 million tonnes 
(including 
18 million tonnes 
in Skovorodino-
Daqing)
2nd section, 
30 million tonnes
BTS-2 oil pipeline 23 March 2012 Initially 30 million 
tons; in April 
2017 extended to 
36 million (in 2012, it 
was planned to extend 
to 50 million tonnes 
in 2013) 
$5 billion 32.7 million tonnes
under construction
“Power of Siberia” 
gas pipeline
planned for 2019 42 bcm Estimated at 
c. €25 billion 
75,5% completed as 
of March 2018 
Turkish Stream gas 
pipeline 
planned for 2019 31.5 bcm €7 billion c. 50% as of March 
2018
gas processing 
plant in 
Khabarovsk 
planned for 2022–23 42 bcm c. $21 billion Construction in 
initial stage
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aPPEndIx 6. OUTFLOW OF CAPITAL (NET)
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Source: Central Bank of Russia, ww.cbr.ru
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aPPEndIx 7. RUSSIA’S ARMED FORCES IN ThE WESTERN 
STRATEGIC DIRECTION
In the Western strategic direction, which is of essential importance from 
the Russian point of view, the RF’s Armed Forces have reached a relative 
equality of potential in comparison to the local NATO forces,	as	well	as	the	
ability	to	develop	an	operational	advantage	on	a	selected	part	of	the	European	
theatre	 of	war.	This	has	 become	possible	 thanks	 to	 the	 intensive	 expansion	
since	2015	of	the	grouping	in	the	Western	strategic	direction.	Growth	poten-
tial	has	been	achieved	in	all	types	of	troops	and	services	mainly	through	ex-
tensive	large-scale	technical	modernisation,	although	in	the	case	of	the	Land	
Forces,	and	to	a	degree	the	Airborne	Troops,	the	most	important	role	has	been	
played	by	the	formation	of	new	units	and	the	expansion	of	existing	units.	 It	
is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	Western	Military	 District	 has	 received	 the	majority	
of	the	tactical	formations	which	were	newly	created	in	recent	years,	and	the	
troops	assembled	in	the	other	military	districts	have	also	been	transferred	to	
the	Western	strategic	direction	(in	the	Rostov	oblast	in	the	Southern	Military	
District)	or	just	beyond	the	Urals	as	part	of	the	second	strategic	echelon	for	the	
Western	direction	(in	the	Central	Military	District).	Meanwhile,	no	new	tacti-
cal	formation	has	been	formed	in	the	Far	East	of	Russia.
The	RF’s	 armed	 forces	 in	 the	Western	 strategic	 direction	 (with	 regard	 to	 the	
units	sent	from	outside	the	Western	Military	District,	including	potential	sec-
ond-line	units	from	the	Central	Military	District)	number	6	divisions	and	30	all-
military	brigades,	as	well	as	a	significant	number	of	support	and	security	units.	
Of	these,	17	artillery	and	rocket	brigades	should	be	considered	particularly	im-
portant	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	Russian	army’s	offensive	capability	(most	
of	the	latter	have	already	been	fitted	with	Iskander	systems,	the	rearmament	of	
the	others	should	be	completed	in	2018).	We	should	also	note	the	large	satura-
tion	of	the	Russian	army	with	engineering	units	(which	have	increased	capabili-
ties	in	the	field	of	constructing	and	organising	road	and	river	crossings),	trans-
port	 and	 electronic	warfare	 (Kaliningrad	 and	 the	western	 oblasts	 of	 Belarus	
are	among	the	areas	of	the	world	most	saturated	with	equipment	for	electronic	
warfare).	Most	units	have	been	reequipped,	with	equipment	including	the	new	
or	completely	upgraded	T-72B3	tanks	(adjusted	to	 the	T-90	standard),	and	the	
BMP-3	and	BTR-82A	armoured	combat	vehicles.	In	2015	distribution	of	the	so-
called	‘Ratnik’	‘future	soldier’	equipment	was	initiated,	and	the	first	batches	of	
the	new-generation	combat	vehicles	on	the	Armata	platform	(T-14	tanks),	Kur-
ganets-25	(infantry	fighting	vehicles)	and	Bumerang	(wheeled	armoured	per-
sonnel	carriers)	were	sent	for	military	testing.	
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In	addition,	in	the	European	part	of	Russia,	the	Russian	Marines	had	the	use	of	
6	tactical	air	squadrons;	in	addition,	in	European	waters	the	Navy	had	21	new	
frigates,	corvettes	and	submarines	equipped	with	Kalibr	missiles	designed	to	
attack	ground	targets	(at	least	ten	more	ships	equipped	with	this	type	of	ar-
mament	are	under	construction).	In	combination	with	the	potential	of	NATO’s	
eastern	flank	(with	regard	to	the	support	approved	by	the	Alliance	at	the	War-
saw	summit	in	July	2016),	these	forces	should	be	considered	sufficient	to	take	
effective	offensive	action.	
Changes in the number of deployed all-military operational formations, 
tactical formations and units of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation 
in the Western strategic direction (the Western Military District and the 
8th Army of the Southern Military District in the Ukrainian direction) 
from 2013–17
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
armies 2 2 2 3 4
corps - - - 2 3
divisions 2 2 2 3 5
brigades / regiments 6/7 6/7 7/7 9/13 7/21
Source: authors’ calculations
